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1 Introduction
What are the economic effects of taxing household wealth? While an enormous literature estimates
the elasticity of labor supply and taxable income, much less is known about how taxes affect the
supply of capital. The lack of evidence makes it hard to assess the desirability of taxing household
wealth, a proposal that has gained interest following Thomas Piketty’s call for a global wealth tax
(Piketty 2014) and new evidence of rising wealth inequality in the United States (Saez & Zucman
2016). How would wealth taxes affect the saving and consumption decisions of the rich? How
would wealth taxes affect avoidance and evasion decisions? Would they reduce wealth inequality,
and by how much?
Answering these questions is difficult due to several empirical challenges. First, while many
countries collect data on labor supply and taxable income, very few countries collect individual
data on wealth. Second, it has been difficult to find compelling variation in wealth taxation that
allows for the estimation of causal effects. What is more, because wealth is always very concen-
trated — much more than labor income — it is crucial to estimate behavioral responses for the very
wealthiest individuals.1 Sources of exogenous variation at the top of the wealth distribution has so
far been elusive. Third, in order to assess the desirability of wealth taxes, and of capital taxes more
broadly, it is important to obtain estimates of long-run effects. While tax design always depends
on the long run, this is a bigger challenge for capital taxes than for labor taxes due to the dynamic
and slow-moving nature of wealth accumulation.
In this paper, we break new ground on these questions. Our laboratory is Denmark, which
offers data and quasi-experimental variation that allow us to overcome the challenges described
above. Until 1997, Denmark taxed household wealth above an exemption threshold located around
the 98th percentile of the household wealth distribution. Through to the 1990s, a dozen of OECD
countries levied similar taxes (OECD 1988), but the Danish wealth tax was the largest of its kind.
The marginal tax rate on wealth equalled 2.2% up until the late 1980s, which corresponds to a
very high rate on the return to wealth.2 The Danish government implemented large changes to the
wealth tax starting in 1989 — cutting the marginal rate to 1% and doubling the exemption threshold
1As we show in the paper, the top 10% owns about half of all wealth in Denmark, while the top 1% owns 20% of all
weath. Wealth concentration in the US is even higher (see Saez & Zucman 2016).
2For example, assuming a rate of return on wealth equal to 6.6% (which is in the ballpark of empirical estimates at
the top), a marginal wealth tax of 2.2% corresponds to a 33.3% tax on the flow of capital income.
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for married couples — before eventually abolishing the tax in 1997. These policy changes represent
one of the largest natural experiment with wealth taxation ever conducted. Besides this experi-
ment, a key advantage of the Danish setting is that the authorities have been collecting micro-level
data on wealth for the entire population since 1980.
Our paper makes three main contributions. The first is to provide quasi-experimental evidence
on the effects of the 1989 tax cuts on wealth accumulation. We consider two different empirical
strategies and samples. One strategy exploits that, among the very wealthiest households, some
face a zero marginal tax rate on wealth due to a tax ceiling that limits the total average tax rate
from personal taxes (income, social security, and wealth taxes). Therefore, the tax cuts had dif-
ferent impacts on those bound and unbound by the ceiling. This allows us to estimate impacts
of wealth taxes on the super wealthy using a difference-in-differences design comparing bound
and unbound taxpayers within the top 1%.3 The other strategy exploits the doubling of the ex-
emption threshold for couples (but not singles), which eliminated wealth taxes among couples
located roughly between the 98th and 99th percentiles of the wealth distribution. This allows us
to estimate impacts of wealth taxes on the moderately wealthy using a difference-in-differences
design comparing couples in the exempted range to couples in other ranges or to singles in the
same range.
The quasi-experimental analysis shows that wealth taxes have sizeable effects on taxable wealth,
with the effects being much larger at the extreme top of the distribution than further down. We
view our evidence as compelling in the sense that, in both of our approaches, the trends in tax-
able wealth for the treatment and control groups are parallel prior to the reform and then begin
to diverge immediately after the reform.4 The effect on wealth builds up over time and is equal
to about 30% after 8 years for the very wealthy (ceiling DD) and about 10% after 8 years for the
moderately wealthy (couples DD). These effects include both behavioral and mechanical effects:
even if households did not change their behavior in response to wealth taxes, the increase in the
after-tax rate of return would mechanically increase wealth over time. We show that the mechani-
cal effects account for about one-quarter of the effect for the ceiling DD and about one-tenth of the
3The ceiling strategy represents a novel empirical approach in the large literature on behavioral responses to taxes.
This approach offers a promising way to identify behavioral responses among the very wealthy that could be imple-
mented in a number of countries with wealth taxes. This is because most countries with wealth taxes (including Norway,
Sweden, France, Spain, and Germany) have such ceiling rules.
4As we describe in the paper, the pre-trends are parallel after making a non-parametric adjustment for differences
in pre-reform portfolio compositions between treatment and control groups. Without adjusting for pre-reform portfolio
composition — specifically differences in housing shares and equity shares across treatments and controls — there
would be bias from confounding asset price movements.
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effect for the couples DD.5 As a result, the behavioral responses to wealth taxes are larger among
the very wealthy than among the moderately wealthy, but by less than the raw estimates suggest.
Our second contribution is to develop a theoretical model allowing us to interpret the reduced-
form impacts in terms of structural primitives. To keep the model relatively simple, we leave out
aspects that are not central to our setting and sample. In particular, because wealthy people tend
to be older people — most of those in the top 1% of the wealth distribution are between 50-90 years
old — we focus on the savings motives that are central to older, wealthy people. We argue that the
lifecycle motive and the bequest motive (or more broadly utility of residual wealth) are important,
while the precautionary motive is second order. Within such a model, we demonstrate how the
reduced-form impact on wealth is driven by four conceptual effects: a substitution effect on con-
sumption proportional to the Elasticity of Intertemporal Consumption (EIS), a substitution effect
on bequests proportional to a bequest elasticity, a wealth effect on the demand for consumption
and bequests, and finally the mechanical effect discussed earlier. The importance of the bequest
elasticity in determining the reduced-form impacts depends on the weight of the bequest motive
in household preferences, and we show that this weight has to be large in order to rationalize the
lifecycle profile of wealth among very wealthy people. Therefore, the bequest elasticity is very
important for understanding wealth responses at the top.
Our third contribution is to connect the theory and evidence in order to explore the long-
run effects of wealth taxes on wealth accumulation. We calibrate the parameters of the model
to match the empirical lifecycle profile of wealth at the top of the distribution as well as the quasi-
experimental estimates of the short-medium term impacts of wealth taxes. When matching the
model to the moderately wealthy in the couples DD — an empirical effect on taxable wealth of
about 10% after 8 years — and simulating the model forward, we obtain a 30-year effect of about
20%. When matching the model to the super wealthy in the ceiling DD — an empirical effect on
taxable wealth of about 30% after 8 years — the long-run effect is considerably larger, about 70%
after 30 years. While this effect may seem large, note that the wealthiest taxpayers have access to
particularly effective avoidance and evasion vehicles, making our model of real wealth accumu-
lation less suited for this population (see Alstadsæter et al. 2017a).6 Our estimates for the super
5The main reason why the mechanical effects are larger in the ceiling DD than in the couples DD is that the former
considers households farther above the exemption threshold, so that their average after-tax return (which governs the
mechanical effect) increases by more.
6Using leaked data from HSBC Switzerland and Mossack Fonseca (“Panama Papers”), Alstadsæter et al. (2017a)
show that essentially all of the wealth in offshore accounts belongs to the top 1% and that most of it belongs to the top
0.1%. If such hidden wealth responds to wealth taxes, this would be picked up by the ceiling DD estimates for the top
1%. It would not be picked up by the couples DD, however, because they are not wealthy enough. Furthermore, for the
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wealthy therefore represent upper bounds on real wealth accumulation responses, whereas the
estimates for the moderately wealthy arguably capture real responses.
Our paper can be viewed in two ways. One view is that it contributes to a nascent literature
studying the effects of wealth taxes (Zoutman 2015; Brülhart et al. 2016; Seim 2017). Compared to
this literature, we consider a larger natural experiment and we estimate behavioral responses at
the very top of the wealth distribution. We provide clear graphical evidence on the short-medium
term responses to wealth taxes.7 Unlike earlier work, our paper provides a tractable dynamic
framework to shed light on the theoretical mechanisms driving the estimated reduced-form im-
pacts, and it structurally estimates the model in order to explore the long-term consequences of
wealth taxation.
Another view is that our paper provides a first attempt to causally estimate the long-run elas-
ticity of capital supply with respect to capital taxes. From this perspective, it is not crucial that we
study wealth taxes per se, but rather that the Danish wealth tax allows us to estimate a key pa-
rameter for assessing the efficiency implications of capital taxes more broadly. Saez & Stantcheva
(2017) show that the long-run elasticity of capital supply with respect to the after-tax rate of re-
turn is a sufficient statistic for optimal capital taxation, but there is virtually no evidence on what
a reasonable value of this elasticity might be. Besides the empirical challenges discussed above,
a reason for the lack of evidence may be that the seminal theoretical contributions guiding the
debate focused on “corner solutions” that did not bring out the key role of the capital supply elas-
ticity. In the Chamley-Judd framework (Chamley 1986; Judd 1985), the optimal capital tax is zero
in steady state because long-run capital supply is infinitely elastic. In the Atkinson-Stiglitz frame-
work (Atkinson & Stiglitz 1976), the optimal capital tax is zero because there is no heterogeneity
in wealth, conditional on labor income. In other words, in one framework capital taxes are un-
desirable because they are too costly for efficiency, while in the other framework capital taxes are
undesirable because they do not improve equity. But in general capital taxes do pose a trade-off
between efficiency and equity, and it is governed by the long-run parameters we estimate here.
In the process of producing the findings described above, we provide a number of bonus con-
tributions. It is worth highlight some of those here. First, our structural approach yields an esti-
moderately wealthy, we present bunching evidence suggesting that avoidance/evasion responses to wealth taxes are
very small.
7Using a kink point created by the exemption threshold in the Swedish wealth tax, Seim (2017) presents compelling
bunching evidence on behavioral responses to wealth taxation. We will also present bunching evidence using the Danish
exemption threshold. However, while bunching is useful for estimating avoidance/evasion responses to wealth taxes,
it cannot be used to capture real responses to wealth taxes (see also Kleven 2016). Because we are primarily interested
in real wealth accumulation in this paper, we do not focus on bunching strategies.
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mate of the bequest elasticity with respect to the net-of-tax rate on capital. While a large literature
discusses the incentive effects of taxes on the size of bequests — typically focusing on estate and
inheritance taxes — there is very little empirical evidence on the question. Reviews by Kopczuk
(2009, 2013a,b) summarize the few existing estimates and discuss the challenges associated with
interpreting them. We estimate the bequest elasticity based on a fundamentally different approach
using variation in wealth taxes (rather than wealth transfer taxes) on wealthy, older people.8 Fo-
cusing on the sample of moderately wealthy people (to avoid evasion effects as discussed above),
we find a bequest elasticity of around 0.5. This elasticity is a key parameter for optimal inheritance
tax rates as shown by Piketty & Saez (2013).
Second, to calibrate our model we carefully document the empirical lifecycle profiles of wealth
at the top of the distribution. Because we have access to full-population administrative wealth
data over a long time horizon, we are able to provide very clean and striking evidence. We show
that wealthy people tend to accumulate wealth through most of their lives; only after they reach
80 years of age do their wealth profiles flatten or fall slightly. As a result, people at the top of the
wealth distribution tend to die close to their wealth peak. For example, among those who make
it to the top 1% of the wealth distribution during their lifetime, the average person is still in the
top 2% at age 90 and have almost 20 times the amount of per capita wealth. These findings show
how inaccurate the pure lifecycle model is for wealthy individuals, and they would be difficult to
rationalize without some form of bequest motive or utility of residual wealth. This part contributes
to a literature trying to explain wealth concentration and the lifecycle saving behavior of the rich
(e.g. Carroll 2002; Benhabib & Bisin 2017), and especially papers emphasizing bequests (e.g. De
Nardi 2004).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and documents the evolution
of wealth concentration in Denmark, section 3 presents quasi-experimental evidence on the effects
of wealth taxation, section 4 develops the theoretical model, section 5 combines the model and
quasi-experimental evidence in order to structurally estimate long-run effects of wealth taxes, and
section 6 concludes.
8As highlighted by Kopczuk (2009), a key conceptual difficulty when analyzing bequests is precisely that they relate
to the stock of wealth, which accumulates over many years and depends on many tax regimes. As a result, it would
be very difficult, if not impossible, to come up with a quasi-experimental design that can deliver the full causal effect
of taxes on bequests without making any parametric assumptions. This motivates the approach developed here, com-
bining quasi-experimental evidence on short-run effects with a parametric model that can convert those effects into the
long run.
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2 Danish Household Wealth: Data and Distribution
2.1 Wealth Data
We base our analysis of household wealth on the administrative wealth registry maintained by the
Danish Statistical Agency. This registry includes annual wealth data for the entire Danish popula-
tion since 1980. The Danish authorities initially collected these data to administer the wealth tax,
but they continued to do so after the abolition of the wealth tax in 1997. The data is not censored
or top-coded, which is a key advantage given our focus on the top of the wealth distribution. We
combine the wealth registry with other administrative registries containing data on income and
socio-economic characteristics such as occupation and family composition.
The wealth registry includes detailed information on end-of-year financial assets, non-financial
assets, and debts. As a rule, these assets are recorded in the registry at their prevailing market
prices. Most of these assets and liabilities are reported by third-parties to the Danish government,
which makes the data very reliable (see Boserup et al. 2014 and Leth-Petersen 2010). For instance,
the value of bank deposits is reported by banks; the value of listed stocks and bonds is reported by
the financial institutions (banks, mutual funds, and insurance companies) who hold these securi-
ties on behalf of their clients; and the value of mortgages is reported by mortgage lenders (banks
or specialized mortgage institutions). Non-financial assets are recorded using land and real estate
registries. Moreover, before the wealth tax was abolished in 1997, all assets other than those re-
ported by third parties had to be self-reported by households. This included cash, large durables
(such as cars, boats, and private planes), non-corporate business assets, unlisted securities (i.e.,
bearer bonds, unlisted equities, and shares of housing cooperatives), assets held abroad (foreign
real estate and foreign bank accounts), and inter-personal debts.
The Danish wealth data are considered of a very high quality, and they have been fruitfully
used to study retirement savings (Chetty et al. 2014), intergenerational wealth mobility (Boserup
et al. 2014), and the accuracy of survey responses (Kreiner et al. 2015). The data does have two
limitations, however. First, they exclude funded pension wealth before 2012, because such assets
were not subject to wealth taxation. This is not a major issue for our purposes, because we are
primarily interested in the effects of wealth taxation on taxable wealth. More broadly, because there
are strict limits on the absolute amount that can be invested in tax-preferred pension accounts,
pension wealth is always a small fraction of wealth at the top of the distribution, the focus of our
analysis. Second, there is a break in the data in 1997 when the wealth tax was abolished. After 1997,
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while the Danish administration continued to collect wealth data from third parties, it stopped
asking households to self-report assets not reported by third parties.9 Because of this break in the
data, our quasi-experimental analysis of behavioral responses to wealth taxation focuses on the
large 1989-reform for which we have consistently measured taxable wealth both before and after
the reform.
2.2 Computing Wealth Inequality
To provide context, we start by documenting the evolution of wealth inequality in Denmark over
the 1980-2012 period. We compute homogeneous series of wealth shares in which we match 100%
of the macroeconomic amount of household wealth at market value recorded in Denmark’s house-
hold balance sheet. This implies that the wealth levels and wealth shares for Denmark are compa-
rable over time and to existing series for other countries, including those estimated for the United
States by Saez & Zucman (2016).10 In keeping with standard national account concepts, our defi-
nition of wealth includes all the non-financial and financial assets that belong to Danish residents,
minus debts. In particular, it includes all funded pension wealth, but excludes the present value
of future government transfers as well as consumer durables and valuables.11 Average household
wealth per adult was $242,000 in 2012 (using the market exchange rate to convert Danish kroner
to US dollars), a level comparable to that of the United States where it is $234,000.
The quality of the Danish data allows us to compute particularly reliable estimates of the wealth
distribution. In most countries one has to rely solely on indirect methods to estimate wealth in-
equality such as the capitalization method or the estate multiplier method (see Zucman 2018 for
a survey). In Denmark, by contrast, we directly observe the market value of most wealth com-
ponents for the entire population in the administrative wealth registry. In order to capture 100%
of the macroeconomic amount of household wealth, we supplement the wealth registry as fol-
lows. First, we impute funded pension wealth throughout the 1980-2012 period, using the fact
9This includes non-corporate business assets, but here the data break is only partial. After 1997, non-corporate
operating equipment and inventories are no longer recorded in the registry data, but the buildings of non-corporate
businesses (which are recorded in the real estate registry) and their financial assets and liabilities (which are reported
by third parties) continue to be.
10Similar wealth series are being produced for a growing number of countries, as published on the World Wealth and
Income Database at http://WID.world (Alvaredo et al. 2017).
11One caveat is that we do not attempt to account for the unreported offshore holdings of Danish households in
Switzerland and other tax havens. Zucman (2013) estimates that about 8% of the world’s household financial wealth is
held offshore globally. We refer the reader to Alstadsæter et al. (2017a,b) for an attempt at including offshore assets in
the wealth distribution of different countries.
7
that individual-level pension wealth was added to the administrative data from 2012 onwards.12
Second, we impute assets not reported by third parties by capitalizing the respective income flows.
Specifically, we compute non-corporate business assets by capitalizing business income (the cap-
italization rate is equal to the market value of business assets divided by the flow of business
income reported on individual income tax returns), while we impute unlisted equities by capital-
izing dividend income. Although these imputations introduce some noise at the micro-level, this
noise is unlikely to bias our wealth shares in any particular direction. Importantly, we only make
these imputations when computing the distribution of wealth in this section. For our main anal-
ysis of behavioral responses to wealth taxes, we focus on reported taxable wealth (thus excluding
pensions) as this is the most appropriate outcome for this purpose.
2.3 Trends in Wealth Concentration
Figure 1 shows wealth shares in three broad classes: the bottom 50%, the next 40%, and the top
10%. Measured in this way, wealth inequality has been relatively stable in Denmark over the last
three decades. Throughout the period, the bottom 50% of the distribution owns a tiny fraction of
aggregate wealth: their assets are barely higher than their debts. Therefore, almost all wealth is
owned by the richest half of the population, and it is shared about equally between the middle
40% and the top 10%. While the wealth shares in the figure are overall stable, wealth inequality
did increase somewhat from the mid 1980s to the early 1990s. During this time, the top 10% wealth
share grew while the bottom 50% wealth share shrank. This evolution was driven by the dynamics
of asset prices, in particular housing prices, which fell significantly during this period. Because the
share of housing in asset portfolios tends to be decreasing in the level of wealth, housing slumps
hurt the bottom more than the top, leading to a rise in wealth inequality.
Figure 2 zooms in on the top of the wealth distribution — the sample that is more relevant for
our tax reform study below — and contrasts Denmark with the United States. Several insights are
worth noting. First, wealth inequality is markedly lower in Denmark than in the US. In 2012, the
top 1% accounts for about 20% of total wealth in Denmark, whereas it accounts for almost 40% in
the US. Average wealth in the population is similar in the two countries, but the top 1% are twice
12The imputation is done as follows. In 2012, we observe that about 40% of pension wealth belongs to wage earners
while 60% belongs to retirees. We assume that these shares were the same before 2012. We then allocate the pension
wealth of workers proportionally to their wage incomes (winsorized at the 99th percentile) and the pension wealth of
retirees proportionally to their pension benefits paid out of pension funds. We have checked that the distribution of
imputed pension wealth for the year 2012 is very close to the observed distribution of pension wealth for that year. Saez
& Zucman (2016) use a similar imputation procedure for the United States.
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as wealthy in the US as they are in Denmark.13 Second, the gap between the two countries has
widened over time. Top wealth shares were increasing in both countries until the late 1990s, but
then they begin to diverge as wealth inequality stabilizes in Denmark while it continues to increase
in the US. Third, the similarity between the two countries until the late 1990s and the subsequent
divergence look more striking as we move into the extreme tail of the distribution. As shown in
the bottom panel of Figure 2, the top 0.1% wealth share in Denmark was only 2-3 percentage points
lower than in the US around year 2000, but then starts to diverge very strongly. If we consider top
0.01% wealth shares (not shown), they are essentially the same in the two countries at the turn of
the century and then diverge.
To conclude, despite the reduction and ultimate abolition of the wealth tax in Denmark in the
1990s, wealth accumulation at the top of the distribution (relative to the population as a whole) has
not picked up speed in Denmark as compared to the US. In other words, the aggregate patterns
documented here do not provide a smoking gun for behavioral impacts of wealth taxes. Of course,
this does not imply that wealth taxes did not affect wealth accumulation and wealth inequality. It
simply means that if the wealth tax cuts caused wealth to grow faster at the top, this unequalizing
force must have been offset by confounding equalizing forces. In our analysis of the causal effect
of wealth taxation, we do find that lower wealth taxes cause wealth to grow faster.14
3 The Effect of Wealth Taxes: Evidence
3.1 Tax Variation and Empirical Strategies
Denmark taxed wealth on an annual basis until 1996. Taxable wealth equalled the total net wealth
of households, excluding pension wealth. Taxable wealth components thus included cash, de-
posits, bonds, equities, housing, large durables and business assets, net of any debts. A number
of these components were third-party reported by financial institutions, leaving little scope for
tax evasion. But some components were self-reported, namely cash, durables, unlisted equities,
non-corporate business assets, and assets held abroad.
Wealth was taxed at a flat rate above an exemption threshold. The exemption threshold varied
13The average person in the top 1% of the US distribution own net wealth of $9.3 million (roughly 40 times average
wealth), as opposed to $4.8 million in Denmark (roughly 20 times average wealth).
14One important confounding reason why wealth inequality has stabilized in Denmark (despite wealth tax cuts) is
likely to be the sharp rise of pension wealth, from around 50% of national income in the late 1980s to 178% in 2014.
Because pension wealth is relatively equally distributed, rising pension wealth tends to reduce inequality. As shown by
Chetty et al. (2014), automatic employer contributions to retirement accounts increase pension and total wealth substan-
tially for middle-class Danish households.
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over time (differentially for singles and couples) as we discuss below, but it was always above the
97th percentile of the household wealth distribution during the period we study. Wealth above
the exemption threshold was taxed at 2.2% until two major reforms in the late 1980s and 1990s.
Between 1989-91 the tax rate was reduced from 2.2% to 1%, while in 1996-97 the wealth tax was
abolished entirely. These tax changes are illustrated in Figure 3.
This setting offers two sources of exogenous tax variation: the kink point at the exemption
threshold and the tax reforms. Let us first consider the former. The kink point is very large as a tax
rate jump of 2.2% on the stock of wealth translates into a very large tax rate jump on the return to
wealth. This would seem to make a bunching strategy potentially compelling.15 However, while
bunching approaches are useful for uncovering evasion and avoidance responses to wealth taxes,
they are not useful for uncovering real responses to such taxes. While this may be true even in the
context of labor income taxation (see Kleven 2016), it is particularly true in the context of wealth
taxation. Taxable wealth depends not only on individual decisions, but also on asset prices that are
highly uncertain and move continuously through the tax year. Given such asset price movements,
it would be virtually impossible for a taxpayer to bunch at the exemption threshold using real
savings responses. Therefore, we will not pursue a bunching strategy as our main approach. We do
start out by documenting bunching at the kink, but we view this evidence primarily as informative
of avoidance responses around the threshold.
Given these considerations, our main analysis will be based on the tax reform variation. In
particular, we focus on the 1989-reform rather than the subsequent elimination of the tax, because
of a data limitation discussed earlier: After abolishing the wealth tax in 1997, Statistics Denmark
no longer records purely self-reported wealth. This break in the taxable wealth series makes it
difficult to study the wealth tax abolishment, and so we focus on the earlier tax cuts that do not
have this limitation.16 To estimate behavioral responses to the 1989-reform, we consider difference-
in-differences (DD) approaches in which we compare treatment and control groups in a balanced
panel of taxpayers. We develop two DD approaches that we now describe.
The first approach uses that the 1989-reform reduced the tax rate from 2.2% to 1%. To define
groups that were differentially affected by this tax cut, we exploit the existence of a ceiling on
15As discussed earlier, the recent paper by Seim (2017) takes a bunching approach using a wealth tax kink in Sweden.
16One could consider using the market-value wealth series constructed in the previous section to provide evidence
on the wealth tax abolishment. However, while this series is consistently measured over time, it does not precisely
capture taxable wealth at the individual level. This series is useful for understanding the evolution of wealth inequality,
but it is not sufficiently precise to estimate taxable income responses to tax reform. We therefore prefer to focus on the
1989-reform for which we observe exact taxable wealth for 8 years after the tax cuts.
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the total tax liability from all personal taxes (income taxes, social security taxes, and wealth taxes)
as a fraction of taxable income. This ceiling — known as Det Vandrette Skatteloft (“horizontal tax
ceiling”) — was in place to limit the total average tax rate on households with large wealth relative
to income. The tax ceiling was set at 78% at the time of the 1989-reform. Whenever the total average
tax rate exceeded this limit, tax liability would be reduced by the excess amount.17 For households
bound by the ceiling, the marginal tax rate on wealth was equal to zero — before and after the
reform — making them a natural control group. Figure A.I in the appendix shows the fraction of
taxpayers bound by the ceiling at different quantiles of the wealth distribution. We see that the
ceiling starts binding for a substantial fraction of households as we move into the extreme tail of
the wealth distribution, allowing us to estimate responses to wealth taxes by the super wealthy.
We will compare taxpayers unbound by the ceiling (treatments) to taxpayers bound by the ceiling
(controls) within the top percentile of the distribution.18 We refer to this strategy as the “ceiling
DD”.
The second approach uses that the 1989-reform increased the exemption threshold for cou-
ples relative to singles. Before the reform, singles and couples faced the same nominal exemption
threshold for wealth taxation. This is difficult to justify on equity grounds, because a couple is
less wealthy in per capita terms than a single individual at the same level of household wealth.
To rectify this issue, the exemption threshold for couples relative to singles was doubled between
1989-1992. These threshold changes are illustrated in Panel B of Figure 3. The implication of the
reform is that couples in a certain range of the household wealth distribution — roughly those
between the 97.6th and the 99.3rd percentiles — became exempt from wealth taxation, allowing us
to estimate responses by the moderately wealthy. We will compare couples in the affected range
(treatments) to singles in the same range or to couples outside the range (controls). We refer to this
strategy as the “couples DD”.
As usual, these difference-in-differences specifications rely on the assumption of parallel trends
between comparison groups. This assumption is more difficult to satisfy when considering wealth
as the outcome than when analyzing more standard outcomes such as labor supply or taxable
income. The reason is that the value of wealth depends on asset prices, which move considerably
17Specifically, wealth tax liability is reduced first (but by no more than 50%) and then income tax liability is reduced
next.
18A more conventional approach to studying these tax rate changes would be compare taxpayers above and below
the exemption threshold. Such difference-in-differences designs have been used in many papers estimating taxable
income responses (see Saez et al. 2012 for a review). As discussed in this literature, this type of strategy is generally not
compelling due to the challenges of dealing with two potential confounders: non-tax changes in inequality (which we
documented in the previous section) and mean reversion. For this reason, we do not pursue such a strategy here.
11
over time and affect groups differently depending on their portfolio composition. For example, if
one group owns more equity and less housing than another group, the relative wealth trends in
these two groups will be affected by non-tax changes in the prices of stocks and housing. Because
our comparison groups do not have the same portfolio composition in the baseline, we have to
control for this source of non-parallel trends. We do this in a non-parametric manner as we now
describe.
Our empirical analysis starts from DD specifications of the following form
logWit = ∑
j 6=1988
βCj · Y earj=t + ∑
j 6=1988
βTj · Y earj=t · Treati + γi +X ′itψ+ νit, (1)
where Wit denotes the wealth of individual i in year t, Y earj=t is a dummy equal to one when the
year equals t, Treati is a dummy equal to one when individual i belongs to the treatment group, γi
is an individual fixed effect, and X ′it is a set of non-parametric controls that we define below. The
assignment of individuals to the treatment group depends on the strategy, either being unbound
by the tax ceiling (ceiling DD) or being in a couple in the exempted range (couples DD). In each
case, treatment status is based on pre-reform variables and to increase persistence we require that
the individual has the same status in three consecutive pre-reform years (1986-88).19 For each
strategy presented below, we plot the evolution of wealth in the control and treatment groups
after absorbing the non-parametric controls, i.e. we show the estimates βˆCt and βˆCt + βˆTt . The
difference between these two series (βˆTt ) is our reduced-form estimate, or intention-to-treat (ITT)
estimate, of the effect of wealth tax reform in year t.
To absorb non-tax trends driven by baseline differences in portfolio composition across groups,
we calculate pre-reform (1988) shares of housing and equities in total wealth and include the fol-
lowing set of controls: (i) dummies for each pre-reform housing share decile interacted with dum-
mies for each year, (ii) dummies for each pre-reform equity share decile interacted with dummies
for each year. In other words, we allow each decile of the housing share and equity share distribu-
tions to have their own non-parametric time trends unrelated to wealth tax reform. Furthermore,
we include (iii) dummies for each pre-reform income decile interacted with dummies for each year.
This last set of controls absorbs any confounding effects of heterogeneity in savings rates across
income levels.
A closely related alternative to these non-parametric controls for pre-reform portfolio compo-
19Therefore, individuals who switch status (say, between bound and unbound or between being couples and singles)
during the three pre-reform years are dropped from the estimation sample.
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sition and income would be DFL reweighting (DiNardo et al. 1996) on those same variables. In
this case, we would reweight observations so that the two groups have the same distribution of
portfolio shares and income in the pre-reform year, and implement a raw difference-in-differences
estimation on the reweighted groups. We present results based on DFL reweighting and show that
this gives similar results to those based on equation (1). Our DFL specifications will be less granu-
lar than the regression controls described above in order to avoid imprecision from cells with few
or zero observations, but we will compare the two approaches at the same level of granularity.
Finally, in order to link the empirical evidence to parameters of models (as we do later), it is
critical to translate the intention-to-treat (ITT) estimates into treatment-on-the-treated (TOT) esti-
mates. Even though we assign treatment status using three pre-reform years (rather than just one),
the treatment and control groups are not perfectly persistent over the post-reform period. We care-
fully document the persistence of comparison groups over time, and turn our ITT effects into TOT
effects using a Wald estimator.
3.2 Bunching Evidence
We start by documenting bunching at the kink. As discussed above, bunching is useful for esti-
mating avoidance or evasion responses to wealth taxes, but not for capturing real wealth accumu-
lation responses. Figure 4 presents bunching evidence for the full population and pooling all years
in which the wealth tax was in place. Panel A shows the observed distribution around the kink in
bins of 20, 000 Danish Kroner (about 20, 000/6 = 3, 333 US Dollars), while Panel B adds an esti-
mate of the counterfactual distribution absent the kink. The counterfactual distribution is obtained
by fitting a polynomial to the observed distribution, excluding data in a range around the kink,
and extrapolating the fitted distribution to the kink.20 This is the standard approach to estimat-
ing counterfactual distributions in the bunching literature as developed by Chetty et al. (2011) and
Kleven & Waseem (2013). In the figure, we also report an estimate of excess bunching b, defined
as the total excess mass around the kink (the area between the observed and counterfactual distri-
butions) scaled by the height of the counterfactual distributions at the kink. This statistic can be
interpreted as the number of bins by which bunchers are moving on average, and it is proportional
to the compensated tax elasticity as first demonstrated by Saez (2010). We refer to the review by
Kleven (2016) for details and discussions of the approach.
20The counterfactual distribution shown in the figure is based on a 5th-order polynomial and an excluded range of 6
bins around the kink (with more bins below than above due to the asymmetry in observed bunching).
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The figure shows that there is some bunching at the exemption threshold, but that the amount
is very modest. The bunching estimate b = 0.386 implies that bunchers reduce taxable wealth by
0.386 bins or 7, 720 Danish kroner.21 This is about 0.3% of wealth at the threshold, which is a very
small response considering the size of the tax incentive. The wealth tax rate jumps by 2.2% in the
early years and by 1% in the later years, which translates into very large drops in the marginal after-
tax return. The implied elasticity is therefore tiny. As a comparison, the Swedish study by Seim
(2017) found somewhat larger bunching at a smaller kink, but even there the estimated elasticity
of taxable wealth was small.
These findings suggest that avoidance and evasion responses to changes in wealth tax rates are
modest. Two points are important to highlight regarding this interpretation. First, the finding of
small avoidance responses applies to the sample of moderately wealthy people around the kink, not
necessarily to the super wealthy located higher up. Second, the finding that avoidance responses to
wealth tax changes are small does not necessarily imply that avoidance levels are small. A general
insight from the compliance literature is the large evasion or avoidance in levels do not necessarily
translate into large elasticities with respect to the tax rate (see e.g., Slemrod & Yitzhaki 2002; Kleven
et al. 2011b).
In the appendix, we provide two additional figures on bunching. Figure A.II investigates het-
erogeneity in bunching across samples with different opportunities to avoid or evade. It compares
employees and self-employed individuals (Panels A-B) as well as “ordinary” and “non-ordinary”
taxpayers (Panels C-D). Non-ordinary taxpayers refer to individuals with extended tax returns due
to complicated tax matters (the self-employed, those with wealth abroad, etc.). The figure shows
that bunching is larger in samples with larger avoidance opportunity, but that bunching remains
modest in all samples. Figure A.III compares bunching before the 1989-reform (when the tax rate
jumped by 2.2% at the kink) and after the 1989-reform (when the tax rate jumped by 1% at the
kink). As one would expect, bunching is much smaller after the reform than it was before. This
provides prima facie evidence that taxpayers understood the incentives created by the reform and
responded to them.
21When constructing the bunching diagram, we adjust the wealth levels in each year to 2014 values (using the national
inflation index), and so the wealth response of 7, 720 DKK is measured in 2014 terms.
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3.3 Ceiling DD: Responses by the Very Wealthy
We now turn to our preferred empirical strategies, starting with the ceiling DD laid out in section
3.1. As described there, we investigate responses to the 1989-reform by comparing taxpayers who
are unbound by the tax ceiling (treatments) to taxpayers who are bound by the tax ceiling (con-
trols). The treatment group experiences a reduction in the marginal wealth tax from 2.2% to 1%,
while the control group experiences no change. Because the tax ceiling becomes effective only at
the very top of the wealth distribution (see Figure A.I), we compare bound and unbound taxpayers
located in the top 1% during the three years leading up to the reform (1986-88). We assign taxpay-
ers to treatment and control groups based on their ceiling status in the same three pre-reform years,
thus dropping taxpayers who frequently switch ceiling status. To further increase the persistence
of the groups, we also drop observations who are only marginally bound by the tax ceiling. In the
baseline specification, the bound group includes those whose wealth tax liability would have to
fall by at least 20% for them to become unbound.
Figure 5 documents the evolution of taxable wealth in these comparison groups, absorbing
trends related to pre-reform differences in portfolio composition or income using specification (1).
Panel A shows the time series of log taxable wealth in the unbound group (red dots) and the bound
group (black squares) between 1985-1996, with both series normalized to zero in the year before
the reform. Panel B shows the differences between the unbound and bound groups in each year
(relative to the pre-reform year), i.e. our difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of the
reform on taxable wealth. Two key insights emerge from the figure. First, the two series are on
parallel trends in the years leading up to the reform and then begin to diverge immediately after
the reform. This clearly suggests that the lowering of the wealth tax rate had a positive effect on
taxable wealth. Second, the effect on taxable wealth is growing over time, exactly as we would
expect if the reform changed the real savings rate. Conversely, if the entire effect were a one-
time avoidance adjustment (for example, a repatriation of hidden wealth abroad), we would see a
different pattern.
The results in Figure 5 represent reduced-form or intention-to-treat (ITT) effects. The treatment
assignment is based on pre-reform ceiling status, which is not perfectly persistent over time. We
may think of pre-reform ceiling status as an instrument for current ceiling status (the latter being
endogenous), in which case the figure shows estimates based on regressing the outcome directly on
the instrument. Figure 6 converts the intention-to-treat (ITT) effects into treatment-on-the-treated
(TOT) effects. Panel A documents the persistence in treatment status by showing, for the bound
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and unbound groups, the fraction who retains their ceiling status over time. By construction,
the unbound group is 100% unbound in the three pre-reform years, while the bound group is
0% unbound in those years. Over time, taxpayers may change their status either by switching
between bound and unbound or by falling below the exemption threshold. The figure shows that
the unbound group is very persistent (as less than 10% have changed status in 1996), while the
bound group is much less persistent (as more than 40% have changed status in 1996). Therefore,
eight years after the reform, there is a 50% difference in the fraction unbound between the two
groups.
Panel B converts the ITT series into a TOT series by dividing the former with the differences
in the fraction from Panel A (Wald estimator). For example, given the 50% difference in treatment
intensity in 1996, the ITT effect is scaled by about two in order to obtain the TOT effect for that
year. When implementing this across time, the dynamically growing effect on taxable wealth is
enhanced, an implication of the gradual reduction in persistence. While the ITT series appear to
stabilize towards the end of the time window, this is not true for the TOT series. The treatment
effect on log wealth is equal to 0.322 in 1996, an increase of about 30% over 8 years.
When considering the effects on wealth, it is important to keep in mind that these include both
behavioral and mechanical effects. The tax reform raises the after-tax rate of return on wealth,
which would increase wealth accumulation even if behavior were fixed. How much of the effects
can be explained by such mechanical effects? This is not an entirely trivial question to answer due
to two complications. The first complication is that the mechanical tax savings cannot be based
on observed wealth as this includes any behavioral responses, but must be based on a measure of
counterfactual wealth. Consistent with the difference-in-differences design, we impute counter-
factual wealth after the reform as observed wealth before the reform (in 1988) plus the growth rate
in wealth experienced by the control group. The second complication is that the tax savings earned
in a given year will grow over time according to a rate of return that is not directly observed in
the data. In the simulation presented below, we assume an annual rate of return equal to 7%. This
falls within the range of existing estimates of wealth returns at the top of the distribution (see e.g.,
Fagereng et al. 2016) and it corresponds to what we assume in the calibration exercise presented
later. Based on these assumptions, we calculate the cumulative mechanical tax savings in each
year due to the reduction in the wealth tax rate from 2.2% to 1%.22 The details of this calculation
22Besides the tax savings from the reduced tax rate, we also account for the fact that a minor fraction of the treatment
group benefit from the increased exemption threshold for couples. Because we are considering taxpayers within the
top 1% and the threshold for couples is raised only just above the 99th percentile cutoff, this part of the reform has a
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are provided in Appendix A.
The results are presented in Figure 7. The figure shows the series of total and behavioral ef-
fects on wealth, with the differences between the two being the mechanical effects. We see that
the mechanical effects are sizeable, but that most of the effects come from changed behavior. The
mechanical effect on log wealth in 1996 equals 0.073, which is less than a quarter of the total ef-
fect. The reason why the mechanical effects are relatively modest has to do with the progressive
nature of wealth tax: taxes are saved only above the exemption threshold located around the 98th
percentile of the wealth distribution. That is, while the behavioral responses are governed by the
change in the marginal after-tax return (which is very large), the mechanical effect is governed by
the change in the average after-tax return (which is more modest). This is a nice feature of the quasi-
experiment we are analyzing. If we had considered similar rate changes in a proportional wealth
tax, the mechanical effects would have been much larger.
In the appendix, we provide three robustness checks. The first check in Figure A.IV consid-
ers an alternative wealth measure in which we exclude self-reported, easy-to-evade components.
Specifically, we subtract cash, durables, and foreign wealth from taxable wealth. We refer to this
measure as “third-party reported wealth”, although some self-reported components remain.23 The
estimated effects on third-party reported wealth are essentially the same as on taxable wealth.
While this suggests that real asset investments are changing in response to the tax cuts, it does not
rule out evasion and avoidance responses. It is possible that the increase in third-party reported
assets is driven in part by shifting from previously unreported items. The best evidence we have of
small avoidance and evasion responses is the bunching evidence presented above, but this applies
to the moderately wealthy taxpayers around the threshold, not to the very wealthy analyzed here.
The second check in Figure A.V investigates a control group that consists only of those who are
strongly bound by the tax ceiling, thereby increasing the persistence of the control group. Specifi-
cally, we include only households whose wealth tax liability would have to fall by at least 50% (as
opposed to 20% in the baseline) for them to become unbound. Reassuringly, the results are essen-
tially unchanged when considering this alternative specification, and this holds for both taxable
wealth and for third-party reported wealth. The intention-to-treat effects are somewhat larger, but
because the fractions treated are correspondingly larger, the treatment-on-the-treated effects are
the same.
relatively small impact in the ceiling design.
23Unlisted equities and non-corporate business assets are both self-reported. We are not able to exclude these compo-
nents from taxable wealth, because we do not observe them at the individual level throughout the period.
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Finally, Figure A.VI compares the results from our baseline regression specification (1) to the
results obtained from DFL reweighting. That is, instead of controlling for differences in pre-reform
portfolio composition and income in a regression framework, we reweight the groups to have the
same pre-reform distribution of those variables. The figure compares two different DFL specifica-
tions (left panels) to the corresponding regression controls (right panels). We consider a parsimo-
nious specification (adjusting for housing share deciles only) and a richer specification (adjusting
for housing share, equity share, and income quintiles). In the richer specification, we consider
quintiles rather than deciles to reduce imprecision from cells with few or zero observations.24 The
main insight from the figure is that the DFL approach produces results that are similar to the re-
gression approach in terms of pre-trends and the dynamic build-up of the effect after the reform.
While the magnitude of the effects is almost the same in the parsimonious specification, the DFL
approach yields somewhat smaller effects in the rich specification.
3.4 Couples DD: Responses by the Moderately Wealthy
In this section we investigate responses by the moderately wealthy. We exploit that the 1989-
reform doubled the exemption threshold for couples, thus eliminating wealth taxation for couples
between the 97.6th and the 99.3rd percentiles of the household wealth distribution. We compare
these households to two alternative control groups: (i) couples located outside the exempted range
(either above or below within the top 5%), (ii) singles located inside the exempted range. As above,
the groups are based on variables (marital status and wealth level) in the three pre-reform years
1986-88. The advantages of the first specification is that we are comparing couples to couples
(which is good for comparability), and that the identifying tax variation is large as the treatments
have their wealth tax eliminated while the controls experience almost no change.25 The advantages
of the second specification is that we are comparing households at the same wealth level, but on
the other hand the identifying tax variation is smaller as the control group benefit from the tax
rate cut from 2.2% to 1%. The fact that there is a significant tax change in the comparison group
may make it harder to pick up any effects, and it implies that we have to assume homogeneous
responsiveness across groups. Therefore, on balance, we prefer the first specification and present
this one first.
24Reweighting simultaneously on housing share, equity share, and income deciles would imply 103 = 1000 cells (as
opposed to 53 = 125 cells when doing it in quintiles).
25To be precise, the part of the control group located above the exempted range (about 20% of the control group) gets
a wealth tax cut from 2.2% to 1%. So in aggregate there is a small change in the control group.
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Figures 8-10 present our findings from comparing couples inside and outside the exempted
range. The three figures are constructed in the same way as the three preceding figures for the ceil-
ing DD. In Figure 8, we see that the treatment and control groups are on almost perfectly parallel
trends before the reform, but that they begin to diverge after the reform. There is a delay of 1-2
years in the effect, which can be explained by the fact that the threshold change was implemented
gradually (between 1989-92) while we are comparing groups based on the full implementation.
As a result, the treatment group is only marginally treated in the first years after the reform. Over
time there is a gradually increasing effect on the stock of wealth, but the magnitude of the effect
is clearly smaller than those obtained for the ceiling DD. One reason may be that the moderately
wealthy are less responsive than the very wealthy — and we will end up concluding that this is
indeed the case — but there are two other reasons why the effects in Figure 8 are relatively modest:
one is related to persistence and the other to mechanical effects.
Figure 9 investigates the persistence of the treatment and control groups, and converts the
ITT effects into TOT effects. The treatment intensity in the treatment group starts from 100% and
falls gradually over time (due to changes in marital status and wealth levels), while the treatment
intensity in the control group starts from 0% and increases gradually over time. In the last year of
the event window, the difference in treatment intensities is slightly less than 40%. The couples DD
is therefore less persistent than the ceilling DD, explaining some of the difference in the results from
the two strategies. When we convert the intention-to-treat effects into treatment-on-the-treated
effects in Panel B, the effects become considerably larger and the gradual dynamic build-up is
strongly enhanced. The effect on the stock of wealth after eight years is about 10%.
Figure 10 splits the total effect on wealth into behavioral and mechanical effects. The basic
methodology is the same as for the ceiling DD (with details provided in Appendix A): we calculate
annual tax savings for the treatment group using a measure of counterfactual wealth, and we
simulate cumulative tax savings assuming an annual rate of return equal to 7%. The figure shows
that the mechanical effect is much smaller for the couples DD than for the ceiling DD, providing
an additional reason why the total effect is smaller. The main explanation is that the couples
DD identifies responses for moderately wealthy households, who were not very far above the
exemption threshold. As a result, the reform did not change their average return very much —
while changing their marginal return by a lot — and so most of the effect is behavioral and very
little of it is mechanical.26 We estimate that the behavioral effect on wealth in 1996 is almost 10%,
26There is an additional, quantitatively less important reason why the mechanical effect is smaller in the couples DD,
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or about 40% of the behavioral effect we found for the very wealthy in the ceiling DD.
The appendix provides three robustness checks. Figure A.VII presents estimates from the same
specification, but considering third-party reported wealth as the outcome. The figure shows ITT
and TOT estimates, and it makes the split between behavioral and mechanical effects. The em-
pirical patterns are similar to those for taxable wealth, but the effects are slightly smaller. Figure
A.VIII presents estimates from a specification where we use singles in the same wealth range as
couples (97.6th-99.3rd percentiles) to form a control group. In this case, the effects are considerably
smaller (about half the size) and the empirical patterns are not as persuasive. As discussed above,
the likely reason is that the control group in this specification also gets a substantial wealth tax cut
(from 2.2% to 1%), implying that we are identifying off the differential tax cuts in the two groups
and rely on an assumption of homogeneous responsiveness. Finally, Figure A.IX compares the
regression-based approach to DFL reweighting. We see that the two different strategies produce
almost identical dynamic patterns and magnitude of effects, which is reassuring.
Table 1 summarizes the main results from our quasi-experimental analysis. It shows estimates
from both the ceiling DD and the couples DD, and it shows the different specifications of the con-
trol group and the non-parametric controls for pre-trends. All of the estimates are statistically
significant at the 1% level. The effects from the ceiling DD are consistently larger than the effects
from the couples DD. Some of this can be explained by differences in mechanical effects, but not
all of it. Therefore, we find that the very wealthy people are are more responsive than moderately
wealthy people. The dynamic patterns we have documented are consistent with real savings ef-
fects, and it is conceivable that very wealthy people are more elastic in their savings behavior. At
the same time, it is likely that the very wealthy respond to wealth taxes partly through avoidance
or evasion. This channel of response may be less available for the moderately wealthy, and in fact
our bunching evidence suggests very small avoidance responses for this population. In the next
section we develop a model of responses to wealth taxes in which we focus on the real savings
channel.
namely that a minor fraction of the control group (those above the exempted range) benefits from the tax rate cuts and
therefore also experiences mechanical tax savings. We net out the tax savings in the control group in Figure 10, which
further reduces the mechanical effect.
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4 The Effect of Wealth Taxes: Theory
4.1 Lifecycle Model With Utility of Residual Wealth
In this section we develop a model for studying the effects of wealth taxation on the wealthy. Our
goal is to construct a model that is sufficiently simple to derive analytical results, but at the same
time rich enough to facilitate interpretation of the empirical results and to allow for informative
calibration exercises. To understand what the key features of such a model should be, we highlight
two empirical facts that will be documented in detail in the next section. First, wealthy people tend
to be older people. For example, almost 80% of those in the top 1% of the wealth distribution are
above age 50, as opposed to only 31% in the general population. Second, wealthy people continue
to accumulate wealth into very old ages and therefore die with lots of wealth.
To match these empirical facts, our model incorporates utility of residual wealth. This may
be interpreted as capturing a bequest motive — and we will refer to it as such — but it may also
capture other utility-of-wealth motivations (see Saez & Stantcheva 2017 for a discussion of different
mechanisms). The specific mechanism is not important for our purposes.27 While our model
accounts for the bequest motive as well as the standard lifecycle motive for saving, it abstracts
from precautionary savings and uncertainty. The precautionary savings motive matters for the
lower tail of the distribution, but it is second order for understanding savings behavior at the top
of the wealth distribution (see e.g., Carroll 2002; De Nardi 2004).28
Households live for T periods and their preferences are specified as follows
σ
σ− 1
T
∑
t=0
δt (ct)
σ−1
σ + δTV (WT+1) , (2)
where ct is consumption in period t, WT+1 is wealth at the end of life (bequests), σ is the elasticity
27We will use the model (together with the quasi-experimental moments) to estimate the long-run responsiveness
of wealth accumulation to wealth taxation. This depends on the curvature of utility from wealth (which we estimate
structurally), but it does not depend directly on the specific reason for utility from wealth. On the other hand, the
specific reason may matter for normative policy analysis. For example, utility of wealth due to warm-glow of bequests
will in general have different optimal tax implications than utility of wealth due to social status, because the former
is associated with positive externalities (calling for Pigouvian subsidies) while the latter is associated with negative
externalities (calling for Pigouvian taxes). However, in either case, the long-run elasticity of capital supply that we
estimate is a key parameter, because it determines the fiscal externality against which we would trade-off the potential
benefits from redistribution and externalities.
28We also abstract from labor supply responses to wealth taxes. Existing evidence from Denmark suggests that labor
supply is relatively inelastic to labor taxes (Kleven & Schultz 2014; Kleven 2014), suggesting that labor supply is also
inelastic to capital taxes and perhaps especially for the population of older, wealthy people studied here. Furthermore,
our explorations of the data shows no evidence of labor supply responses to wealth taxation when using the same
empirical strategies (ceiling DD and couples DD) as those used for estimating savings responses.
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of intertemporal substitution (EIS), and δ is the discount factor. To capture utility of bequests, we
adopt the following parameterization
V (WT+1) = A
α
α− 1
(
WT+1
A
)α−1
α
, (3)
where A determines the strenght of the bequest motive (under A = 0 the model corresponds to
the pure lifecycle model) and α is a bequest elasticity. This is a warm-glow bequest motive as
introduced by Andreoni (1989, 1990) and used for studying estate taxation by for example Farhi
& Werning (2010), Piketty & Saez (2013), and Kopczuk (2013a). For simplicity of exposition, we
abstract from estate taxes (as our focus is on wealth taxes rather than on wealth transfer taxes) and
model warm glow as a function of gross wealth.
In each period, there is a tax rate τ on household wealth above an exemption threshold W¯ . For
someone with wealth above the exemption threshold in period t, the budget constraint is given by
ct = yt +RWt − τR (Wt − W¯ )−Wt+1
= yt + (1− τ )RWt + τRW¯ −Wt+1, (4)
where yt is (exogenous) labor income net of income tax,Wt is wealth at the beginning of the period,
and R is the gross rate of return. We assume that R is time-invariant, but this is straightforward
to generalize and has no important implications for our results. The second line of the budget
constraint (4) is a “virtual income” representation: it writes the budget as if the net-of-tax return
equals (1− τ )R on all units of wealth, but provides a lump-sum income of τRW¯ to compensate
for the fact that the tax is not paid below the threshold. Combining all the per-period budget
constraints, we can express the lifetime budget constraint as
T
∑
t=0
ct
((1− τ )R)t +
WT+1
((1− τ )R)T
=
T
∑
t=0
yt
((1− τ )R)t +
T
∑
t=1
τRW¯
((1− τ )R)t +W
n
0 , (5)
where Wn0 ≡ (1− τ )RW0 + τRW¯ is initial (exogenous) wealth after tax.
Households maximize lifetime utility (2)-(3) subject to the lifetime budget constraint (5) with
respect to consumption and bequests. The first-order conditions for ct and ct+1 yield the standard
Euler equation,
ct+1 = (δ (1− τ )R)σ ct, (6)
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while the first-order conditions for WT+1 and cT give
WT+1 = Ac
α/σ
T . (7)
The solution to the model is described by the lifetime budget (5), the Euler equations (6) for all t,
and the bequest condition (7). These conditions determine c0, ..., cT and WT+1. Wealth Wt in any
given period can then be backed out using the per-period budget constraints.
Using the Euler equations in each period, we can write consumption in period t and bequests
in terms of consumption in period 0, i.e.
ct = (δ (1− τ )R)tσ c0, (8)
WT+1 = A (δ (1− τ )R)Tα cα/σ0 . (9)
Inserting these conditions into (5), we can express the choice of c0 as
T
∑
t=0
qt · c0 + qb · cα/σ0 =
T
∑
t=0
yt
((1− τ )R)t +
T
∑
t=1
τRW¯
((1− τ )R)t +W
n
0 , (10)
where qt ≡ (δ(1−τ )R)
tσ
((1−τ )R)t denotes present-value expenditures on consumption in period t relative
to period 0, and qb ≡ A(δ(1−τ )R)
Tα
((1−τ )R)T denotes present-value expenditures on bequests relative to
consumption in period 0. This expression is useful for characterizing the effects of wealth taxes.
4.2 The Effect of Wealth Taxes
Consider a permanent change in the wealth tax rate, dτ , holding the exemption threshold W¯ con-
stant. The tax change is announced in period 0, and may affect wealth from the end of this period,
W1. Initial after-tax wealth Wn0 is pre-determined. We investigate the effect on households who
are above the threshold W¯ (and stay above over time), as opposed to the effect on households who
are sometimes below and sometimes above the threshold over their lifetime. The former scenario
is simpler to analyze, and it fits our quasi-experimental setting in which we estimate responses
by households above the exemption threshold. The potential response by those who are below
the exemption threshold, but expect to rise above it in the future, is not captured by our empirical
design and would be very hard to estimate in general.29
29Such responses — if they are empirically relevant — cannot be persuasively identified using within-country vari-
ation, because everyone is potentially treated and the treatment intensity is unobservable to the econometrician. One
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We characterize analytically how the reduced-form effect of changing the wealth tax rate —
what we have estimated empirically — relates to the structural parameters of the model. We start
by deriving the effect of taxes on first-period wealthW1, and then show how the effect accumulates
over time. The effect of taxes includes both substitution and wealth effects. To characterize the
wealth effect, it is useful to define the amount of initial resources a household would have to
receive to be able to afford an unchanged bundle of consumption and bequests when the net-of-
tax return changes. This can be obtained by differentiating the lifetime budget constraint (5) with
respect to 1− τ , holding behavior {ct}T0 ,WT+1 constant but allowing initial wealth to adjust. We
denote this compensating change in initial wealth by dWC0 .
We may state the following proposition:
Proposition 1 (First-Period Reduced-Form Effect). Consider a permanent change in the wealth tax rate
τ from period 0 onwards. The reduced-form elasticity of first-period wealth W1 with respect to the net-of-tax
rate 1− τ can be expressed as
dW1
d (1− τ )
1− τ
W0
= σ ·
{
∑Tt=0 tqt
∑Tt=0 qt + qb
α
σ c
α/σ−1
0
c0
W0
}
+ α ·
{
Tqb
∑Tt=0 qt + qb
α
σ c
α/σ−1
0
cα/σ0
W0
}
+
dWC0
d (1− τ )
1− τ
W0
·
{
1
∑Tt=0 qt + qb
α
σ c
α/σ−1
0
}
, (11)
where qt ≡ (δ(1−τ )R)
tσ
((1−τ )R)t , qb ≡
A(δ(1−τ )R)Tα
((1−τ )R)T , and dW
C
0 ≤ 0 is a compensating wealth change allowing
the household to afford an unchanged bundle of consumption and bequests when 1− τ changes. The first
term is a substitution effect on consumption (positive), the second term is a substitution effect on bequests
(positive), and the third term is the wealth effect (negative).
Proof: See Appendix B. 
This result shows that the reduced-form elasticity of wealth (one period after the tax change) is
an involved function of all the parameters of the model. There are three qualitative effects on
wealth accumulation. First, there is a substitution effect on consumption. A larger net-of-tax return
induces households to shift consumption to later in life, thereby increasing wealth accumulation.
This effect is proportional to the EIS σ.30 Second, there is a substitution effect on bequests. A larger
would have to make comparisons across economies with different wealth taxes, raising a number of empirical chal-
lenges. The evidence on Denmark vs the US presented in section 2.3 is an example of such a cross-country comparison,
and our discussion of this evidence illustrates the confounders that make interpretation difficult.
30Our wording is somewhat loose here. The effect is only proportional in σ when taking the complicated term in
braces (which itself depends on σ) as given.
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net-of-tax return reduces the price on bequests, further increasing wealth accumulation. This effect
is proportional to the bequest elasticity α, and it depends on the weight of the bequest motive A.
The bequest effect vanishes when A (and therefore qb) goes to zero, but can be important when A
is large. We show later that A has to be very large to rationalize the lifecycle profiles of wealthy
people, which puts the bequest elasticity α at center stage. Finally, there is the wealth effect. A
larger net-of-tax return increases lifetime resources, which leads to larger consumption and lower
savings. The presence of the wealth effect implies that the total reduced-form effect is ambiguous
in sign.
A simplifying special case is where bequests and consumption goods are equally elastic, i.e.
α = σ. This is a natural benchmark assumption if bequests are viewed as future consumption (for
the next generation). With α = σ, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 2 (First-Period Reduced-Form Effect Simplified). Assuming α = σ (bequest elasticity
equals the EIS), the reduced-form elasticity of first-period wealthW1 with respect to the net-of-tax rate 1− τ
simplifies to
dW1
d (1− τ )
1− τ
W0
= σ ·
{
∑Tt=0 tqt + TAqT
∑Tt=0 qt +AqT
c0
W0
}
+
dWC0
d (1− τ )
1− τ
W0
·
{
1
∑Tt=0 qt +AqT
}
, (12)
where qt ≡ (δ(1−τ )R)
tσ
((1−τ )R)t and dW
C
0 ≤ 0 is the compensating wealth change allowing the household to afford
an unchanged bundle of consumption and bequests when 1− τ changes. The first term is the substitution
effect on both consumption and bequests (positive) and the second term is the wealth effect (negative).
Proof: Follows from setting α = σ (and thus qb = AqT ) in equation (11). 
This result provides a simpler characterization of the reduced-form elasticity. There is only one
substitution term (capturing both consumption and bequest responses) and it is proportional to the
structural elasticity σ = α. We do not rely on the assumption of σ = α in the structural estimation
presented below, but identify these two parameters separately. Given the lack of evidence on
bequest elasticities (see Kopczuk 2009, 2013b), this is a contribution in itself.
The one-period effect derived above is helpful for establishing economic intuition, but our
empirical analysis provides estimates over more than one year. We have estimates of the reduced-
form elasticity dWt
d(1−τ )
1−τ
Wt
in each year t over 8 years. How does the theoretical effect of wealth
taxes accumulate over time? We now consider the effect in any period t as a function of the effect
in period 1 provided above.
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From the per-period budget constraint (4), we have
Wt = yt−1 + (1− τ )RWt−1 + τRW¯ − ct−1.
We may substitute out Wt−1 using the one-period lagged equation, and then substitute out Wt−2
using the two-period lagged equation, and so on. This process allows us to write
Wt = [(1− τ )R]t−1Wn0 +
t−1
∑
j=0
(yj − cj) [(1− τ )R]t−1−j +
t−1
∑
j=1
τRW¯ [(1− τ )R]t−1−j . (13)
Thus, Wt equals the sum of initial net wealth Wn0 with returns, t periods of savings yj − cj with
returns, and the virtual income adjustment with returns. Using this expression, we may state the
following proposition:
Proposition 3 (Period-t Reduced-Form Effect). Consider a permanent change in the wealth tax rate τ
from period 0 onwards. The reduced-form elasticity of wealth in period t, Wt, with respect to the net-of-tax
rate 1− τ can be expressed as
dWt/Wt
d (1− τ ) / (1− τ ) = dM + dB, (14)
where dM is a mechanical effect given by
dM = (t− 1) [(1− τ )R]t−1 W
n
0
Wt
+
t−1
∑
j=0
(t− 1− j) [(1− τ )R]t−1−j yj − cj
Wt
−
t−1
∑
j=1
(
1− τ (t− 1− j)1− τ
)
[(1− τ )R]t−j W¯
Wt
, (15)
and dB is a behavioral effect given by
dB =
t−1
∑
j=0
qj
[(1− τ )R]1−t
{
dW1/W0
d (1− τ ) / (1− τ )
W0
Wt
− jσ c0
Wt
}
. (16)
In equation (16), the first term in braces, dW1/W0
d(1−τ )/(1−τ ) , is characterized in Proposition 1 for the general case
and in Proposition 2 for the special case of α = σ.
Proof: See Appendix B. 
While the first-period effect consists only of behavioral terms, the t-period effect consists of both
behavioral and mechanical terms. The mechanical term reflects that, as 1− τ increases, the indi-
vidual earns larger net-of-tax returns on initial wealth and savings in each period. This increases
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wealth over time, holding consumption/savings behavior fixed. As a result, estimating signif-
icant reduced-form effects on wealth does not necessarily imply that people are elastic in their
consumption or bequest behavior. However, as we saw in the previous section, the mechanical
effect is a minor fraction of the total effect in our empirical setting due to the progressive design
of the wealth tax. In addition to the mechanical effect, there will be behavioral effects as captured
by the expression in (16). These consist of the one-period effect derived earlier (substitution and
wealth effect) accumulating over time, along with additional substitution effects on consumption
from period 1 onwards.
What have we learned from this theoretical exercise? First, the elasticity of wealth with respect
to taxes is very far from a structural parameter. It is endogenous to all the other parameters of the
dynamic setting, and its size depends mechanically on the time horizon of the estimate. Second,
the magnitude of any reduced-form elasticity is most naturally assessed in terms of the structural
elasticities of intertemporal substitution (σ) and bequests (α) implied by it. This requires a theo-
retical model and taking a stand on other parameters. It is in general possible to observe “large”
effects under modest structural elasticities due to the mechanical effects. Third, the theoretical
characterization allows us to calibrate the model to quasi-experimental moments obtained over
the short-medium run, and then use the calibrated model to assess long-run effects. Such long-run
simulations would rely on parametric assumptions, but in a way that respects shorter-run non-
parametric moments. Given the gradual, dynamic nature of wealth accumulation, it would be
difficult (or impossible) to capture the long-run effects without a parametric model.
5 Connecting Theory and Evidence: Long-Run Effects
5.1 Empirical Lifecycle Profiles of Wealth
To calibrate our model, we start by studying the empirical lifecycle profiles of wealth among house-
holds at the top of the distribution. Besides informing our calibration exercise, these lifecycle pro-
files will provide qualitative insights on the savings behavior of the rich and contribute to an area
where we have relatively little evidence. Because we have household-level information on wealth
for the full population over a long time period, we are able to present particularly clean and strik-
ing evidence.
Figure 11 shows lifecycle profiles of wealth between the ages of 20 to 90 for the full population
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(in Panel A) and for the top percentiles of the population (in Panel B).31 We highlight the following
key points regarding the construction of the figure. First, the graphs show profiles of taxable wealth
and therefore do not include pension wealth. Pension wealth is not very important at the top of
the distribution (which is our main interest), but they are significant when considering the full
population. Second, the graphs show profiles of normalized log wealth. Denoting log wealth for
individual i at age a in year t by log (Wiat), we define normalized log wealth as ωiat ≡ log (Wiat)−
E [log (Wiat) | t]. That is, we normalize log wealth for each individual in each year by the average
wealth in the population in that year, so that the lifecycle profiles are not confounded by asset
price inflation.32 Third, we consider unbalanced panels of individuals, because this allows us to
show very wide age ranges. We consider balanced panels in narrower age ranges below. Finally,
when showing individuals in the top percentiles of the distribution, we select individuals who
are in the top p% at some point during their lives, but not necessarily in every year. That is, we do
not condition the sample on being in the top p% at each age, but allow them to build up wealth
gradually and draw down wealth at the end of life. This way of selecting the sample is more
informative for understanding the lifecycle savings behavior of the wealthy.33
The following key findings emerge from Figure 11. The average person in the population
(Panel A) accumulates wealth until just after age 60 and draws down wealth thereafter. In other
words, the average person reaches her wealth peak around the age of retirement, consistent with
the predictions of a pure lifecycle model without any bequest motive or utility of wealth.34 At the
same time, wealth is still higher than average wealth in the population (the horizontal line at zero)
at age 90, suggesting that the pure lifecycle savings motive is not the only factor at play.
When turning to the wealthiest segments of the population (Panel B), the picture changes dras-
tically. Wealthy individuals tend to accumulate wealth through most of their lifetime. Not until
after the age of 80 do we observe any draw-down of wealth, and even then the draw-down is only
marginal. For example, those who reach the top 1% of the wealth distribution during their lifetime,
surpasses the exemption threshold for the wealth tax (demarcated by the horizontal line) around
age 50 and stay well above it until age 90. Figure A.X in appendix shows the same type of graph,
31Here we consider individuals (rather than households) as the units of analysis, but split household wealth in mar-
ried couples equally between the spouses.
32This normalization implies that the mean of ωiat in each year t equals zero. The mean of ωiat in each age bin is
calculated as E {E [ωiat | a, t] | a}, i.e. we first calculate means in bins of age a and year t, and then we calculate means
in age bins over all years. This gives different calendar years the same weight in the calculated means.
33However, we do condition the sample on being in the top p% for at least three years (not necessarily three consecu-
tive years) in order to avoid noise from transitory wealth shocks.
34This pattern would be reinforced by including pension wealth, because in general people pay into such schemes
during their working lives and draw benefits during retirement.
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but with wealth percentiles (instead of amounts) on the y-axis and including the extreme top of the
distribution. There we see that those who reach the top 1% during their lifetime are, on average,
located above the 98th percentile cutoff at the age of 90. Those who reach the top 0.5% are located
at the 99th percentile cutoff at age 90, while those who reach the top 0.1% are located at the 99.8th
percentile cutoff at age 90. There must be some form of utility of residual wealth (due to a bequest
motive or another mechanism) in order to rationalize these empirical patterns.
Have these lifecycle patterns changed over time? Specifically, have they changed from before
to after the 1989-reform that we analyze in this paper? Figure 12 investigates this question by
comparing the lifecycle profiles of wealth before the reform (1980-88) and after the reform (1989-
96).35 In this figure, we focus on individuals in the top 1% of the wealth distribution, selected in the
same way as the top 1% in the previous graph. We focus on the age range 60-90 during which the
top 1% is always above the wealth tax threshold on average. The series are otherwise constructed
in the same way as in the previous figure. We see that there are no striking changes in the lifecycle
profile over time: both profiles stay quite flat into very old ages and provide no indication that
the wealth tax cuts increased wealth accumulation (or reduced draw-down) for people close to
death. This time series comparison cannot be taken as causal evidence of the effect of the reform,
but we do use one aspect of it in the calibration below. Specifically, in the calibration of the bequest
motive, we use the fact that wealth accumulation in the very last years of life (after the age of 80)
is unchanged from before to after the reform.
A potential concern with these graphs, especially in terms of interpreting what happens at very
old ages, is that they are based on unbalanced samples. People drop out of the samples as they
die, which may affect the wealth profiles due to selection on mortality. As we move out into the
tail of the age distribution, we are increasingly considering people who live long and such people
may tend to be wealthier. If so, this would understate the within-person wealth draw-down at
the end of life. To investigate this issue, Figure A.XI shows lifecycle profiles of wealth for the
top 1% in a balanced sample. Panel A of the figure compares wealth profiles in balanced and
unbalanced samples between 70-90 years of age, while Panel B compares wealth profiles before
the reform (1980-88) and after the reform (1989-96) in the balanced sample. Panel A shows that the
balanced sample do feature stronger wealth draw-down at the end of life, consistent with some
selection on mortality. However, the extent of this draw-down is small. Moreover, it is driven
35We define the after-reform period as 1989-96 in order to avoid any confounding effects from the wealth tax abolish-
ment in 1997 and from the change in measured wealth after the abolishment of the wealth tax.
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largely by changes after the wealth tax abolishment in 1997, which can be seen from Panel B.
This graph shows that both before and after the 1989-reform — but within the wealth tax period
1980-96 — the wealth profile among the very old is almost completely flat even in the balanced
sample. Overall, considering balanced samples do not change the fundamental insights from the
unbalanced samples.
5.2 Calibration
To study the long-run effect of wealth taxes on the wealthy, we calibrate the model from section
4 to fit the empirical lifecycle profile of wealth at the top along with the quasi-experimental esti-
mates of the impact of wealth tax reform. Because our theoretical model is a representative agent
framework, we calibrate it to fit the average wealth profile in specific wealth ranges that vary
by experiment. In particular, the quasi-experimental analysis considered two different empirical
strategies and samples: the couples DD gave treatments effects roughly between the 98th and 99th
percentile cutoffs, while the ceiling DD gave treatment effects above the 99th percentile cutoff. The
lifecycle profiles in Figure A.X show that the couples DD is captured well by the “top 1% sample”
(i.e., the sample of those who reach the top 1% at some point in their lives) during the age range
from 60 to 90. The figure also shows that the ceiling DD is captured well by the “top 0.3% sample”
during the same age range. Therefore, we show calibrations for each of these experiments and
samples over a 30-year lifespan, where age 61 corresponds to period t = 0 and age 90 corresponds
to period t = T . Wealth at death, WT+1, is thus defined as wealth at the end of the 90th year.
To fit the empirical lifecycle profile of wealth in the baseline with τ = 0.022, we set initial wealth
W0 equal to observed wealth at age 60 and calibrate the bequest parameter A so that end-of-life
wealth WT+1 equals observed wealth at age 90. The calibration of A uses the optimal bequest
condition (9) under τ = 0.022. Thus, our calibrations ensure that the baseline wealth path matches
the observed start and end points over the considered age range. To capture the shape of the wealth
profile between periods 0 and T , we calibrate the discount factor δ given a reasonable value of the
gross rate of return R. The calibrated values are R = 1.07 and δ ≈ 0.96.36 As we shall see, our
parsimonious model is able to fit the empirical lifecycle profile very well.
We calibrate the EIS σ and the bequest elasticity α to match the quasi-experimental moments
from the analysis of the 1989-reform. The structural parameters must be matched to the treatment-
36As we do not explicitly account for income taxes,R should be interpreted as the gross rate of return after the taxation
of capital income. Even so, R = 1.07 falls well within the range of estimates returns at the top of the wealth distribution
(see Fagereng et al. 2016).
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on-the-treated (TOT) effects, and we exploit the full dynamic pattern of those effects. We have
estimates for each year between 1989-96, giving us eight moments to identify two parameters. The
reason why the dynamic pattern of the estimates is informative is that the two elasticities σ,α have
different implications for the time path of behavioral responses: the EIS channel is relatively strong
in the short run, while the bequest elasticity channel is relatively strong in the long run. Therefore,
the two elasticities determine, not just the overall magnitude of the effects, but also the concavity
or convexity of the effects over time. When σ is larger (smaller) relative to α, the time path of
effects is more concave (convex).
Specifically, we calibrate σ and α by minimizing a standard quadratic loss function, i.e.
L (σ,α) =
8
∑
t=1
[TOTt − ∆logWt (σ,α)]2 , (17)
where TOTt is the estimated treatment effect in year t and ∆logWt (σ,α) is the model-predicted
effect in year t under the structural primitives σ,α. Recall that we have TOT estimates of both the
total effect and the behavioral effect, where the latter excludes the mechanical effect. We will match
on the total effect, letting the mechanical and behavioral effects be a “free variables”. In general,
our model does not exactly match the mechanical effect in the data, in part because our representa-
tive agent approach does not explicitly model the different tax parameters for singles and couples.
We consider a unique threshold W¯ and a unique tax rate τ , translating the tax reform (part of which
changed the exemption threshold for couples relative to singles) into an implied average change in
the tax rate ∆τ . To put it differently, while our empirical estimates are based on experiments that
change tax rates partly through household-specific threshold changes, our calibration exercises
translate this into a simpler experiment that changes the tax rate on a representative individual.
Although we could estimate σ and α based solely on equation (17), we bring in an additional
empirical moment to disciplin the calibration. As we saw in the previous section, the age profile
of wealth (among the wealthy) tend to be flat towards the end of life. Specifically, we showed that
the wealth profile is roughly flat after the age of 80, and that this is true both before and after the
wealth tax reform. Calibrations that imply strongly increasing or decreasing wealth during the
last years of life do not seem reasonable in light of these facts. As a result, we require that the
average wealth growth during the last 10 years of life remain the same after the reform as before
the reform. The estimation of σ and α is therefore based on minimizing equation (17) subject to
this requirement on the wealth path during the last years of life.
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To summarize, our calibration procedure consists of two interconnected steps. In the first step
we calibrate one set of parameters (such as the weight on bequests A and the discount factor δ)
to match the wealth profile in the baseline with τ = 0.022, taking the structural elasticities σ and
α as given. In the second step we calibrate σ and α to match the quasi-experimental estimates
of the effects of tax reform, taking the parameters from the first step as given. We loop back and
forth between these two steps until we converge to a fixed point where the elasticities found in the
second step correspond to those used as input in the first step.
5.3 Simulating the Long-Run Effects of Wealth Taxation
We first consider the effects of wealth taxation on the moderately wealthy (couples DD), i.e. on
taxpayers between the 98th and 99th percentile cutoffs of the wealth distribution. As discussed
earlier, this population features only small avoidance responses to wealth taxation, which makes
our model of real wealth accumulation particularly appropriate. Recall that the absence of strong
avoidance responses in this sample is suggested by two empirical facts: (i) the finding in this paper
of very small bunching at the exemption threshold, and (ii) the finding by Alstadsæter et al. (2017a)
that hidden wealth is substantial only within the top 1% (and mostly within the top 0.1%).
Our findings are shown in Figure 13. Panel A shows three wealth paths: the empirical wealth
path (dotted black line), the simulated wealth path before the reform (solid black line), and the
simulated wealth path after the reform (solid red line). The simulated wealth path before the
reform is calibrated to fit the empirical wealth path. The simulated wealth path after the reform
is based on a reduction of the wealth tax rate by 1.84 percentage points, corresponding to the
differential tax cut between the treatment and control groups in the couples DD. Our calibration
ensures that the differences between the before-reform and after-reform wealth paths respect the
quasi-experimental estimates during the first 8 years. This can be seen in Panel B, which compares
the simulated effects on log wealth (solid orange line) to the estimated effects (dotted blue line).
This panel also splits the total effect into the underlying mechanical and behavioral effects (dashed
grey lines).
The following insights are worth highlighting. First, the effect of the wealth tax reduction
on the stock of wealth grows for about 20 years and then starts to stabilize. At the end of life,
wealth is about 20% higher than it would have been absent the reform. Second, while this effect is
sizeable, the underlying tax incentive driving it is very large. Writing the net-of-tax rate of return
as (1− τ )R− 1, the reform-induced change in the return is equal to −∆τ ·R/ ((1− τ )R− 1) =
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42%. Therefore, the long-run elasticity of wealth with respect to the net-of-tax rate of return is
about 0.5. Third, another way of gauging the size of the effect is by considering the “structural
primitives” implied by the calibration. These are summarized in Table 2, which shows that the
EIS is 0.75 and the bequest elasticity is 0.51. The bequest elasticity weighs heavily in the long-run
effect, because the weight on the bequest motive is large (A = 13.53).37
Finally, the figure illustrates that the mechanical effect becomes increasingly important over
time. In fact, in this calibration, the positive effect on end-of-life wealth is driven entirely by the
mechanical effect, while the behavioral effect is negative. To understand this, Figure A.XII in the
appendix shows the consumption paths before and after the reform. Because of the substitution
effects of tax cuts (governed by σ and α), households shift consumption from earlier periods to
later periods. At the same time, from the wealth effect, households want to increase consumption
in all periods. The two effects together imply that consumption is reduced (savings are increased)
only for a short period of time. Therefore, when wealth taxes are reduced, the households save less
during most of their lives.38 The compounded impact of these savings reductions eventually turn
the behavioral effect negative. Even with the negative behavioral effects, the strong mechanical
effects prevent wealth from falling and allow households to die with considerably larger wealth
than they would have in the presence of the wealth tax.
We now turn to the very wealthiest taxpayers (ceiling DD), namely those within the top 1%
of the wealth distribution. The very wealthy featured stronger responses than the moderately
wealthy in the quasi-experimental analysis, and it is likely that some or all of this additional re-
sponsiveness represents avoidance or evasion. While our theoretical framework does not explicitly
characterize the avoidance decision, the model may still be useful for extrapolating the estimated
short-run responses forward in time. But it does mean that the structural parameters — for ex-
ample the EIS — will pick up evasion responses and therefore cannot be interpreted in the usual
way.
The results are presented in Figure 14, which is constructed in the same way as the preceding
37Figure A.XIII in the appendix illustrates how the calibration of α and σ works. The two parameters are set to ensure
that the model fits both the quasi-experimental moments during years 1,...,8 and the observed flatness of the wealth
profile at the end of life (before and after the reform). While different combinations of the two parameters can provide
a reasonable fit of the short-term effects (a lower α can be compensated for by a higher σ), the additional requirement
on the end-of-life profile nails both parameters. As discussed in the previous section, the concavity or convexity of
the estimated effects over time may in itself be informative of the relative magnitudes of α and σ. While this is true
in general, our calibration is not very robust when using only those moments, because the time path of the estimates
happens to be almost linear. If we had observed stronger concavity or convexity, the composition of the effect on α and
σ would have been better identified.
38Or rather, because we are looking at a sample of older people who dissave, the effect of the tax cut is make them
dissave more during most of their remaining life.
33
figure. Here the reform experiment is a reduction in the wealth tax rate by 1.56 percentage points,
corresponding to the average tax cut in the treatment group of unbound taxpayers. As before, the
model does a good job of fitting the baseline wealth profile to the empirical profile (Panel A) and
the wealth responses to the quasi-experimental moments (Panel B). The effect of cutting wealth
taxes on long-run wealth is equal to about 70%. Given that the percentage change in the net-of-tax
rate of return is equal to −∆τ ·R/ ((1− τ )R− 1) = 36%, the implied long-run elasticity of wealth
is about 2. Slightly more than half of this effect is mechanical, while the rest is behavioral. The me-
chanical effects are stronger in this experiment than in the previous one (because the population is
wealthier), but because the total effects on which we are matching are also stronger, the behavioral
effects remain positive throughout. The calibrated “structural elasticities” σ,α are very large in
this case (as shown in Table 2), but as we have discussed they are partly picking up avoidance
responses.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we address one of the most important unanswered questions in public finance: What
is the effect of capital taxation on capital supply? The answer to this question is critical for as-
sessing the desirability of taxing capital income or wealth. There is an existing empirical literature
studying different aspects of capital taxation — including a handful of papers on wealth taxation
and many more on wealth transfer taxation — but there is no consensus on what might be a rea-
sonable range for the elasticity of capital supply, particularly in the long run. Saez & Stantcheva
(2017) show that this elasticity parameter provides a sufficient statistic for optimal capital taxation,
but they do not cite any empirical evidence on its value. As discussed in the beginning, the lack
of evidence in this area can be explained by a number of methodological difficulties. There are
major empirical challenges related to both measurement and identification, as well as conceptual
challenges related to the modeling of savings motives and the dynamic nature of wealth accu-
mulation. Through a combination of quasi-experimental analysis based on administrative wealth
records, theoretical modeling and calibration, we have tried to make progress on this question.
For the bigger picture, it is worth discussing what our estimates may be missing. We highlight
three potential limitations. First, our estimates capture the effect of wealth taxes on those who are
already wealthy, as opposed to the forward-looking effect on those who aspire to become wealthy.
The aspiration effect of wealth taxes, even if it is quantitatively important, is extremely difficult to
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identify empirically. One would have to compare the savings behavior of the potentially wealthy
across economies that vary permanently in their levels of capital taxation, but such cross-country
analyses are typically not persuasive.
Second, our estimates capture the effect of wealth taxes conditional on staying in Denmark. In
other words, we do not consider the potential migration response to wealth taxes at the top. While
there some evidence on migration responses to labor income taxes at the top (see Kleven et al.
2011a, 2014; Akcigit et al. 2016), there is virtually no evidence on migration responses to capital
or wealth taxes.39 Such responses are difficult to study due to lack of statistical power: we are
studying the extreme tail of the wealth distribution, and given the low frequencies of international
migration, very few individuals are moving country from year to year. Furthermore, moving to
another country is arguably not the most natural response to wealth taxes. Because capital tends
to be more mobile than people, it would be more natural to move wealth across borders (which
would be picked up by our taxable wealth estimates) than to move the household across borders.
Third, our quasi-experimental approach captures the effect of wealth taxes in partial equilib-
rium. The changes in wealth accumulation that we find may have implications for asset prices
and wage rates, making the general equilibrium effect different from the partial equilibrium effect.
While this is important to keep in mind, it is a limitation of any quasi-experimental study (i.e.,
of any well-identified study). Our partial equilibrium estimates provide a set of moments that
economists can target when calibrating general equilibrium models.
Finally, while we have motivated our contribution by its importance for assessing the desir-
ability of capital taxation, we do not undertake an optimal tax analysis in this paper. Given the
machinery required, this is beyond the scope of this paper. We hope that future work on optimal
capital taxation will build on the empirical work presented here.
39An exception is the paper by Martínez (2017), who provides evidence on migration responses to reductions in in-
come and wealth taxes in the Swiss canton of Obwalden. These estimates capture migration across tax jurisdictions
within a country, as opposed to migration across international borders. On the latter, Zucman (2008) considered migra-
tion responses in response to a French wealth tax, but found little evidence of any effect.
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FIGURE 1: DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH IN DENMARK, 1980-2012
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Notes: This figure shows the share of total household wealth in Denmark owned by the bottom 50% of the distribution,
the middle 40% (adults between the median and the 90th percentile), and the top 10%. The unit of observation is
the adult individual (aged 20 or above), splitting household wealth in married couples equally among the spouses.
Wealth includes all financial and non-financial assets, net of any debts. It matches the total amount of household wealth
recorded in Denmark’s household balance sheet.
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FIGURE 2: TOP 1% AND TOP 0.1% WEALTH SHARES IN DENMARK VS THE UNITED
STATES
A: Top 1% Wealth Share
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B: Top 0.1% Wealth Share
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Notes: This figure shows the share of total household wealth owned by the top 1% (Panel A) and the top 0.1% (Panel B)
in Denmark vs United States. In both countries, the unit of observation is the adult individual (aged 20 or above),
splitting household wealth in married couples equally among the spouses. Wealth includes all financial and non-
financial assets, net of any debts, and it adds up to the total amount of household wealth recorded in Denmark’s and
the United States’ household balance sheets.
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FIGURE 3: WEALTH TAX VARIATION
A: Marginal Tax Rate
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Notes: This figure shows the evolution of the marginal tax rate (Panel A) and the exemption threshold (Panel B) in the
Danish wealth tax.
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FIGURE 4: BUNCHING AT THE KINK
A: Observed Distribution
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B: Observed vs Counterfactual Distribution
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Notes: This figure shows the distribution of taxable wealth in bins of 20,000 DKK (about 20,000/6 USD Dollars) around
the exemption threshold (kink point) of the Danish wealth tax, pooling the years 1980-1996. Taxable wealth is measured
in terms of its distance to the threshold in each year (putting the kink point at zero), and we adjust for inflation to
ensure comparability across years. Panel A shows the observed distribution, while Panel B adds an estimate of the
counterfactual distribution absent the kink. The counterfactual is obtained by fitting a 5th-order polynomial to the
observed distribution, excluding 6 bins around the kink. The bunching estimate b equals excess mass around the kink,
scaled by the height of the counterfactual distribution at the kink.
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FIGURE 5: DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES COMPARING HOUSEHOLDS BOUND AND
UNBOUND BY TAX CEILING
A: Time Series of Bound and Unbound Households
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Notes: The figure shows the (intention-to-treat) effects of wealth tax reform on taxable wealth based on the “ceiling DD”
approach. The estimation sample is a balanced panel of households observed in all years 1985-1996 and located in the
top 1% of the wealth distribution before the reform. Panel A shows the evolution of taxable wealth in the unbound group
(tax rate cuts) and the bound group (no tax rate cuts), normalized to zero in the pre-reform year 1988, after absorbing
the impact of pre-reform differences in portfolio composition and income using specification (1). Panel B shows the
differences between these two series, i.e. our difference-in-differences estimates. The 95% confidence intervals are
based on robust standard errors clustered at the household level.
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FIGURE 6: CEILING DD: TREATMENT EFFECT ON THE TREATED
A: Persistence of Treatment Status
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Notes: The figure converts the intention-to-treat (ITT) estimates into treatment-on-the-treated (TOT) estimates. Panel A
shows the persistence in treatment status over time. The unbound group switches status either if they become bound
or if their wealth falls below the (pre-reform) exemption threshold. The bound group switches status if they become
unbound or if their wealth falls below the (pre-reform) exemption threshold. Panel B converts the ITT series into a TOT
series by dividing the ITT estimates with the differences in fraction treated from Panel A. The 95% confidence intervals
of the TOT estimates are based on the standard errors of the ITT estimates divided by the differences in fraction treated
from Panel A.
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FIGURE 7: CEILING DD: BEHAVIORAL VS MECHANICAL EFFECTS
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Notes: The figure shows the composition of the total effect of wealth tax reform into mechanical and behavioral effects.
The calculation of the mechanical effects is described in Appendix A. The behavioral effect equals the total effect minus
the mechanical effect.
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FIGURE 8: DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES COMPARING COUPLES INSIDE AND OUT-
SIDE THE EXEMPTED RANGE
A: Time Series of Couples Inside and Outside Range
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Notes: The figure shows the (intention-to-treat) effects of wealth tax reform on taxable wealth based on the “couples
DD” approach. The estimation sample is a balanced panel of married couples observed in all years 1985-1996 and
located in the top 5% of the wealth distribution before the reform. Panel A shows the evolution of taxable wealth for
couples inside the exempted range and couples outside the exempted range, normalized to zero in the pre-reform year
1988, after absorbing the impact of pre-reform differences in portfolio composition and income using specification (1).
Panel B shows the differences between these two series, i.e. our difference-in-differences estimates. The 95% confidence
intervals are based on robust standard errors clustered at the household level.
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FIGURE 9: COUPLES DD: TREATMENT EFFECT ON THE TREATED
A: Persistence of Treatment Status
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Notes: The figure converts the intention-to-treat (ITT) estimates into treatment-on-the-treated (TOT) estimates. Panel A
shows the persistence in treatment status over time. Couples inside the exempted range switch treatment status if their
wealth falls below or rises above the exempted range, and conversely for couples outside the exempted range. Panel B
converts the ITT series into a TOT series by dividing the ITT estimates with the differences in fraction treated from Panel
A. The 95% confidence intervals of the TOT estimates are based on the standard errors of the ITT estimates divided by
the differences in fraction treated from Panel A.
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FIGURE 10: COUPLES DD: BEHAVIORAL VS MECHANICAL EFFECTS
Reform
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Notes: The figure shows the composition of the total effect of wealth tax reform into mechanical and behavioral effects.
The calculation of the mechanical effects is described in Appendix A. The behavioral effect equals the total effect minus
the mechanical effect.
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FIGURE 11: EMPIRICAL LIFECYCLE PROFILES OF WEALTH
A: Full Population
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Notes: The figure shows lifecycle profiles of taxable wealth between the ages of 20-90 in an unbalanced panel of indi-
viduals over the period 1980-2012. To avoid any confounding effects of inflation as people grow older, we normalize log
wealth for each individual in each year by the average wealth in the population in that year. The graphs show averages
of this normalized wealth measure in different age bins. Panel A shows the lifecycle profile in the full population, while
Panel B shows lifecycle profiles in the top percentiles of the population. The top-percentile samples include individu-
als who are in the top p% for at least three years of their observed lifespan, keeping them in the data for their entire
observed lifespan.
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FIGURE 12: EMPIRICAL LIFECYCLE PROFILES OF WEALTH FOR THE TOP 1% BEFORE
AND AFTER THE REFORM
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Notes: The figure shows lifecycle profiles of taxable wealth between the ages of 60-90 in an unbalanced panel of indi-
viduals before the reform (1980-1988) and after the reform (1989-96), respectively. To avoid any confounding effects of
inflation as people grow older, we normalize log wealth for each individual in each year by the average wealth in the
population in that year. The graphs show averages of this normalized wealth measure in different age bins. The sample
consists of individuals who make it to the top 1% for at least three years of their observed lifespan, keeping them in the
data for their entire observed lifespan. The grey-shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals.
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FIGURE 13: LONG-RUN EFFECTS OF CUTTING WEALTH TAXES: THE MODERATELY
WEALTHY (COUPLES DD)
A: Observed and Simulated Wealth Paths
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B: Long-Run Effects of Wealth Tax Cut
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Notes: The figure shows the long-run effects of wealth tax cuts when calibrating our model to the sample and estimates
from the couples DD. These are effects for the moderately wealthy (between the 98th and 99th percentile cutoffs). The
reform experiment cuts the wealth tax rate by 1.84 percentage points, corresponding to the differential tax cut between
the treatment and control groups. Panel A shows the empirical lifecycle profile of wealth, the simulated lifecycle profile
before the reform (calibrated to fit the empirical profile), and the simulated lifecycle profile after the reform. Panel B
illustrates the total effects, the mechanical effects, and the behavioral effects on taxable wealth over 30 years, demon-
strating that the model matches the quasi-experimental estimates over the initial 8 years.
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FIGURE 14: LONG-RUN EFFECTS OF CUTTING WEALTH TAXES: THE VERY WEALTHY
(CEILING DD)
A: Observed and Simulated Wealth Paths
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B: Long-Run Effects of Wealth Tax Cut
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Notes: The figure shows the long-run effects of wealth tax cuts when calibrating our model to the sample and estimates
from the ceiling DD. These are effects for the very wealthy (within the top 1%). The reform experiment cuts the wealth
tax rate by 1.56 percentage points, corresponding to the tax cut for the average person in the treatment group. Panel
A shows the empirical lifecycle profile of wealth, the simulated lifecycle profile before the reform (calibrated to fit the
empirical profile), and the simulated lifecycle profile after the reform. Panel B illustrates the total effects, the mechanical
effects, and the behavioral effects on taxable wealth over 30 years, demonstrating that the model matches the quasi-
experimental estimates over the initial 8 years.
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TABLE 1: DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES ESTIMATES OF WEALTH RESPONSES TO WEALTH TAX CUTS
Ceiling DD (Very Wealthy) Couples DD (Moderately Wealthy)
Unbound vs Bound Unbound vs Very Bound Couples vs Couples Couples vs Singles
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Taxable Wealth
ITT Effect in 1996 0.093 0.159 0.131 0.191 0.037 0.038 0.109 0.025
(0.021) (0.022) (0.031) (0.032) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
TOT Effect in 1996 0.189 0.322 0.226 0.330 0.100 0.104 0.198 0.045
(0.043) (0.045) (0.053) (0.055) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014)
Observations 138,384 138,384 126,336 126,336 520,452 520,452 340,428 340,428
Panel B: Third-Party Wealth
ITT Effect in 1996 0.098 0.165 0.129 0.189 0.030 0.029 0.118 0.031
(0.022) (0.023) (0.032) (0.034) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
TOT Effect in 1996 0.200 0.335 0.224 0.328 0.083 0.079 0.214 0.057
(0.021) (0.047) (0.056) (0.058) (0.017) (0.017) (0.014) (0.015)
Observations 138,165 138,165 126,152 126,152 519,939 519,939 340,198 340,198
Household FE X X X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X X X X
Equity Shares × Year FE X X X X
Housing Shares × Year FE X X X X
Income Deciles × Year FE X X X X
Notes: The table summarizes our estimates of the intent-to-treat (ITT) and treatment-on-the-treated (TOT) effects of the 1989 wealth tax cuts. We show the effects on
taxable wealth (Panel A) and on third-party reported wealth (Panel B) obtained from the ceiling DD (very wealthy) and the couples DD (moderately wealthy). We
show estimates across different specifications of the control group and of the non-parametric controls. Columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) show plain DD estimates based
on specifications with only household and year fixed effects. Columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) show our preferred DD estimates based on specification (1) in which we
control for the impact of pre-reform portfolio composition and income. The estimation sample is a balanced panel of households observed in all years 1985-1996.
Robust standard errors are clustered at the household level.
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TABLE 2: SIMULATION ANALYSIS OF LONG-RUN EFFECTS
Couples DD Ceiling DD
(Moderately Wealthy) (Very Wealthy)
8-Year
Effect
30-Year
Effect
8-Year
Effect
30-Year
Effect
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Effects on Wealth
Total Effect 0.09 0.19 0.34 0.73
Mechanical Effect 0.03 0.40 0.05 0.44
Behavioral Effect 0.06 -0.21 0.29 0.29
Panel B: Calibration
R 1.07 1.07
δ 0.956 0.958
A 13.53 18.17
σ 0.75 5.07
α 0.51 3.23
Notes: The table summarizes the simulation results shown in Figures 13-14 and the underlying calibrations of param-
eters. We show the 8-year effects on wealth (corresponding to the last year in which we can directly estimate those
effects) and the 30-year effects on wealth.
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A Mechanical Effects of Wealth Tax Reform
To compute the mechanical effects of the 1989-reform, we distinguish between single and married
individuals as they were treated differently by the reform. We index marital status by m = 0, 1.
As described above, the mechanical tax savings of the treated must be based on a measure of
counterfactual wealth. Focusing on representative individuals (single and married, respectively)
in the treatment group, we define counterfactual wealth in year t as average actual wealth in 1988
(pre-reform year) adjusted for the wealth growth in the control group between 1988 and year t.
That is, the counterfactual wealth for marital status m in year t is given by
W˜mt =

E [Wmit | m, t] if t = 1988
W˜mt−1 ×Gmt if t > 1988
(18)
whereGmt denotes the growth rate for marital statusm in the control group between year t− 1 and
t.
When calculating the tax savings, we take into account that the tax rate was gradually reduced
from 2.2 % to 1% between 1989-91, while the exemption threshold was gradually increased for
couples relative to singles between 1989-1992.40 We denote by ∆τt the tax rate reduction between
year t and 1988. Furthermore, we denote by Wmt the exemption threshold for marital status m
in year t. With this notation, the mechanical tax savings in year t due to the 1989-reform can be
defined as
∆taxmt = (1−m) × I
[
W˜ 0t ≥W 0t
]
×
(
∆τt ·
(
W˜ 0t −W 0t
))
+m ×
{
I
[
W
0
t ≤ W˜ 1t < W 1t
]
×
(
0.022 ·
(
W˜ 1t −W 0t
))
+ I
[
W˜ 1t ≥W 1t
]
×
(
0.022 ·
(
W
1
t −W 0t
)
+ ∆τt ·
(
W˜ 1t −W 1t
))}
.
(19)
The first line captures tax savings for singles and shows that they save ∆τt on counterfactual wealth
above the singles threshold. The second and third lines capture tax savings for couples. Couples
who have counterfactual wealth between the singles threshold W 0t and the couples threshold W
1
t
save 2.2% on wealth aboveW 0t . Couples who have counterfactual wealth above the couples thresh-
old W 1t save 2.2% on the difference between the thresholds, W
1
t −W 0t , and another ∆τt on wealth
above the couples threshold.
40Notice that there were additional tax cuts (a rate reduction and a threshold increase) in 1996, the last year of the
wealth tax before its abolishment. We do not include the mechanical effects of these tax changes, because we are inter-
ested in studying the effects of the 1989-reform on its own.
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Equation (19) gives the mechanical tax savings within a given year t, but those tax savings will
grow over time according to a rate of return that is not directly observed in the data. We assume
a gross rate of return equal to R = 1.07, broadly in line with empirical estimates of rates of return
and consistent with the calibration exercise in section 5. The cumulative tax savings for marital
status m in year t can be defined as
∆cumtaxmt =

∆taxmt if t = 1989
∆taxmt + ∆cumtaxmt−1 ×R if t > 1989
(20)
The last step of the procedure is to translate the cumulative tax savings into a log effect on
wealth. This is done as follows
∆ logWt = E
[
log
(
W˜mt + ∆cumtax
m
t
)
− log
(
W˜mt
)
| t
]
, (21)
where E [·] is the average across singles and married individuals, using the marriage share in the
pre-reform year 1988.
The procedure described above provides a measure of the mechanical effect on individuals in
the treatment group. We note that, while the control group does not save any taxes in the ceiling
DD (as those bound by the ceiling face a fixed average tax rate), the control group in the couples
DD does save some taxes. When we compare couples located in the exempted range (between
W
0
t and W
1
t ) to couples located either below or above that range (below W
0
t or above W
1
t ), there
will be tax savings for those located above. The tax savings are relatively small for the control
group as a whole, because those located above W 1t represent only about 20% of the control group.
We calculate the mechanical tax savings for the control group using the same approach as for the
treatment group.41 The mechanical effect on wealth (that we subtract from the total estimated
difference-in-differences effect) equals the effect for the treatment group minus the effect for the
control group.
41The calculation of tax savings for the control group using equations (19)-(20) is based on their actual wealth rather
than on their counterfactual wealth. This is not exactly right because their actual wealth includes the mechanical ef-
fect as well as a potential behavioral response. But the error thus introduced is likely to be minor. Having cal-
culated ∆cumtaxmt for the control group, we convert it into a log effect on wealth using the equation ∆ logWt =
E
[
log
(
W˜mt
)
− log
(
W˜mt − ∆cumtaxmt
)
| t
]
, where W˜mt ≡ E [Wmit | m, t] denotes the average actual wealth.
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B Proofs
To prove Proposition 1, we totally differentiate equation (10) with respect to 1− τ and c0. After
rearranging terms, this gives
dW1
d (1− τ )
{
T
∑
t=0
qt + qb
α
σ
c
α
σ
−1
0
}
=
T
∑
t=0
∂qt
∂ (1− τ ) · c0 +
∂qb
∂ (1− τ ) · c
α
σ
0
+
T
∑
t=0
tRyt
((1− τ )R)t+1 +
T
∑
t=1
{
[(1− τ )R+ tτR]RW¯
((1− τ )R)t+1
}
, (22)
where we have used dc0 = −dW1. From the definitions qt = (δ(1−τ )R)
tσ
((1−τ )R)t and qb =
A(δ(1−τ )R)Tα
((1−τ )R)T , we
obtain
∂qt
∂ (1− τ ) =
σtqt
1− τ −
tR (δ (1− τ )R)tσ
((1− τ )R)t+1 , (23)
∂qb
∂ (1− τ ) =
αTqb
1− τ −
TRA (δ (1− τ )R)Tα
((1− τ )R)T+1
, (24)
which allows us to rewrite equation (22) as follows
dW1
d (1− τ )
{
T
∑
t=0
qt + qb
α
σ
c
α
σ
−1
0
}
=
T
∑
t=0
σtqt
1− τ · c0 +
αTqb
1− τ · c
α
σ
0
−
T
∑
t=0
tR (δ (1− τ )R)tσ
((1− τ )R)t+1 · c0 −
TRA (δ (1− τ )R)Tα
((1− τ )R)T+1
· c
α
σ
0 (25)
+
T
∑
t=0
tRyt
((1− τ )R)t+1 +
T
∑
t=1
{
[(1− τ )R+ tτR]RW¯
((1− τ )R)t+1
}
.
The first line on the RHS represents substitution effects from the EIS σ and the bequest elasticity
α. The second and third lines represent wealth effects. To see this, we take the lifetime budget
constraint (5) and totally differentiate it with respect to (1− τ ) andWn0 , holding behavior constant.
This gives the compensating change in initial wealthWn0 that would allow the household to buy an
unchanged bundle of consumpion and bequests when taxes change. Denoting this compensating
change by dWC0 , we may write
dWC0
d (1− τ ) = −
T
∑
t=0
tRct
((1− τ )R)t+1 −
TRWT+1
((1− τ )R)T+1
+
T
∑
t=0
tRyt
((1− τ )R)t+1 +
T
∑
t=1
{
[(1− τ )R+ tτR]RW¯
((1− τ )R)t+1
}
. (26)
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The expression on the RHS of (26) is identical to the second and third lines of (25) once we account
for the fact that, from household optimization, ct = (δ (1− τ )R)tσ c0 andWT+1 = A (δ (1− τ )R)Tα c
α
σ
0 .
This allows us to rewrite equation (25) to
dW1
d (1− τ )
{
T
∑
t=0
qt + qb
α
σ
c
α
σ
−1
0
}
=
T
∑
t=0
σtqt
1− τ · c0 +
αTqb
1− τ · c
α
σ
0 +
dWC0
d (1− τ ) , (27)
which can be immediately rearranged to give the expression in equation (11) of Proposition 1. The
expression has three terms: a substitution effect on consumption governed by σ, a substitution
effect on bequests governed by α, and the wealth effect captured by the compensating wealth
change dW
C
0
d(1−τ ) . Equation (12) of Proposition 2 follows from setting α = σ (which implies qb =
AqT ) in equation (11). In this case the two substitution effects can be consolidated into one effect
governed by a single structural elasticity α = σ.
To prove Proposition 3, we totally differentiate equation (13) with respect to 1− τ , Wt, and cj .
This gives
dWt/Wt
d (1− τ ) / (1− τ ) = (t− 1) [(1− τ )R]
t−1 Wn0
Wt
+
t−1
∑
j=0
(t− 1− j) [(1− τ )R]t−1−j yj − cj
Wt
−
t−1
∑
j=1
(
1− τ (t− 1− j)1− τ
)
[(1− τ )R]t−j W¯
Wt
(28)
−
t−1
∑
j=0
[(1− τ )R]t−1−j dcj/Wt
d (1− τ ) / (1− τ ) .
In this expression, the first three terms correspond to the mechanical effect dM shown in equation
(15) of Proposition 3. The last term corresponds to the behavioral effect dB in equation (16). To see
this, we start from the Euler equation shown in (8): cj = (δ (1− τ )R)jσ c0. We totally differentiate
this condition and rearrange terms, which gives
dcj/Wt
d (1− τ ) / (1− τ ) = jσ (δ (1− τ )R)
jσ c0
Wt
+ (δ (1− τ )R)jσ dc0/Wt
d (1− τ ) / (1− τ ) . (29)
Using dc0 = −dW1, we can rewrite this to
dcj/Wt
d (1− τ ) / (1− τ ) = jσ (δ (1− τ )R)
jσ c0
Wt
− (δ (1− τ )R)jσ dW1/W0
d (1− τ ) / (1− τ )
W0
Wt
= (δ (1− τ )R)jσ
{
jσ
c0
Wt
− dW1/W0
d (1− τ ) / (1− τ )
W0
Wt
}
. (30)
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Finally, inserting (30) into (28) and using qj ≡ (δ(1−τ )R)
jσ
((1−τ )R)j , we obtain
dWt/Wt
d (1− τ ) / (1− τ ) = (t− 1) [(1− τ )R]
t−1 Wn0
Wt
+
t−1
∑
j=0
(t− 1− j) [(1− τ )R]t−1−j yj − cj
Wt
−
t−1
∑
j=1
(
1− τ (t− 1− j)1− τ
)
[(1− τ )R]t−j W¯
Wt
(31)
+
t−1
∑
j=0
qj
[(1− τ )R]1−t
{
dW1/W0
d (1− τ ) / (1− τ )
W0
Wt
− jσ c0
Wt
}
,
which is the result in Proposition 3.
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C Appendix Figures
FIGURE A.I: FRACTIONS BOUND AND UNBOUND BY TAX CEILING
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Notes: The figure shows the fraction of households bound and unbound by the tax ceiling at different quantiles of the
wealth distribution (within the top 1%) in the pre-reform year, 1988.
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FIGURE A.II: HETEROGENEITY IN BUNCHING
A: Employees B: Self-Employed
Kink Point
b=0.334 (0.038)
0
40
00
80
00
12
00
0
16
00
0
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
-500000 -300000 -100000 100000 300000 500000
Taxable Wealth - Threshold
Observed Counterfactual
Kink Point
b=0.534 (0.058)
0
20
00
40
00
60
00
80
00
10
00
0
12
00
0
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
-500000 -300000 -100000 100000 300000 500000
Taxable Wealth - Threshold
Observed Counterfactual
C: “Ordinary” Taxpayers D: “Non-Ordinary” Taxpayers
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b=0.503 (0.060)
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Notes: The figure shows heterogeneity in bunching across samples with different opportunities to avoid or evade taxes.
Panels A and B compare employees and self-employed individuals, while Panels C and D compare “ordinary” and
“non-ordinary” taxpayers. Non-ordinary taxpayers are defined as those who have self-employment income or who
have foreign wealth or income. The diagrams are otherwise constructed in the same way as Figure 4, Panel B. The
bunching estimate b varies with opportunity to evade in the expected direction, but the differences are not very large.
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FIGURE A.III: BUNCHING BEFORE AND AFTER THE 1989-REFORM
A: Before 1989-Reform
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B: After 1989-Reform
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Notes: The figure shows bunching at the kink before the 1989-reform (pooling 1980-88) and after the 1989-reform (pool-
ing 1989-96). The diagrams are otherwise constructed in the same way as Figure 4, Panel B. As expected, the amount of
bunching b is larger before the reform when the size of the wealth tax kink was larger.
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FIGURE A.IV: CEILING DD USING THIRD-PARTY REPORTED WEALTH
A: Intent to Treat vs Treatment on Treated
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B: Behavioral vs Mechanical Effects
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Notes: The figure shows the effects of wealth tax reform on “third-party reported wealth” based on the ceiling DD
approach. Third-party reported wealth is defined as (taxable wealth – cash – durables – foreign wealth). Panel A shows
intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates and treatment-on-the-treated (TOT) estimates of the total effect of tax reform. Panel B
decomposes the total effect into mechanical and behavioral effects. Besides the difference in wealth measure, the two
panels are constructed in the same way as the analogous diagrams shown earlier.
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FIGURE A.V: CEILING DD USING STRONGLY BOUND HOUSEHOLDS AS CONTROLS
A: Taxable Wealth
Reform
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B: Third-Party Reported Wealth
Reform
ITT 1996 = 0.189 (0.034)
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Notes: The figure shows the effects of wealth tax reform based on a ceiling DD where we use only strongly bound
households as controls. Specifically, the control group consists of households whose wealth tax liability would have
to fall by at least 50% (as opposed to 20% in the baseline) for them to become unbound by the tax ceiling. We show
intent-to-treat (ITT) and treatment-on-the-treated (TOT) estimates for both taxable wealth (Panel A) and third-party
reported wealth (Panel B). Besides the difference in control group, the two panels are constructed in the same way as
the analogous diagrams shown earlier.
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FIGURE A.VI: CEILING DD UNDER DFL REWEIGHTING VS REGRESSION CONTROLS
A: DFL Reweighting B: Non-Parametric Controls
Housing Share Deciles Housing Share Deciles
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C: DFL Reweighting D: Non-Parametric Controls
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Notes: The figure compares DD estimates obtained from our baseline specification (1) to DD estimates obtained from
DFL reweighting. While the baseline specification is based on controlling non-parametrically for differences in pre-
reform variables that may impact wealth trends, the DFL specification reweights treatment and control groups to have
the same pre-reform distribution of those variables. The figure compares two different DFL specifications (left panels) to
the corresponding regression controls (right panels). We consider parsimonious specifications in Panels A-B (adjusting
for housing share deciles only) and richer specifications in Panels C-D (adjusting for housing share, equity share, and
income quintiles).
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FIGURE A.VII: COUPLES DD USING THIRD-PARTY REPORTED WEALTH
A: Intent to Treat vs Treatment on Treated
Reform
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Reform
Total Effect 1996 = 0.079
Behavioral Effect 1996 = 0.072
Mechanical Effect 1996 = 0.007
-.1
0
.1
.2
Lo
g 
Th
ird
 P
ar
ty
 W
ea
lth
 (1
98
8=
0)
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Year
Total Effect Behavioral Effect
Reform
Notes: The figure shows the effects of wealth tax reform on “third-party reported wealth” based on the couples DD
approach. Third-party reported wealth is defined as (taxable wealth – cash – durables – foreign wealth). Panel A shows
intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates and treatment-on-the-treated (TOT) estimates of the total effect of tax reform. Panel B
decomposes the total effect into mechanical and behavioral effects. Besides the difference in wealth measure, the two
panels are constructed in the same way as the analogous diagrams shown earlier.
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FIGURE A.VIII: COUPLES DD USING SINGLES INSIDE EXEMPTED RANGE AS CON-
TROLS
A: Taxable Wealth
Reform
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Reform
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Notes: The figure shows the effects of wealth tax reform based on a couples DD where we use singles inside the ex-
empted wealth range as controls. That is, while the baseline specification compares couples inside the exempted range
to couples outside the exempted range, we are now comparing couples to singles in the same wealth range. Both of
these groups get wealth tax cuts, but the singles get a smaller cut than couples. We show intent-to-treat (ITT) and
treatment-on-the-treated (TOT) estimates for both taxable wealth (Panel A) and third-party reported wealth (Panel B).
Besides the difference in control group, the two panels are constructed in the same way as the analogous diagrams
shown earlier.
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FIGURE A.IX: COUPLES DD UNDER DFL REWEIGHTING VS REGRESSION CONTROLS
A: DFL Reweighting B: Non-Parametric Controls
Housing Share Deciles Housing Share Deciles
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C: DFL Reweighting D: Non-Parametric Controls
Housing Share and Equity Share Deciles Housing Share and Equity Share Deciles
Reform
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Notes: The figure compares DD estimates obtained from our baseline specification (1) to DD estimates obtained from
DFL reweighting. While the baseline specification is based on controlling non-parametrically for differences in pre-
reform variables that may impact wealth trends, the DFL specification reweights treatment and control groups to have
the same pre-reform distribution of those variables. The figure compares two different DFL specifications (left panels) to
the corresponding regression controls (right panels). We consider parsimonious specifications in Panels A-B (adjusting
for housing share deciles only) and richer specifications in Panels C-D (adjusting for both housing share and equity
share deciles).
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FIGURE A.X: EMPIRICAL LIFECYCLE PROFILES OF WEALTH AT THE EXTREME TOP (IN
TERMS OF PERCENTILES)
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Notes: The figure shows lifecycle profiles of taxable wealth between the ages of 60-90 in an unbalanced panel of indi-
viduals over the period 1980-2012. The figure is constructed in the same way as Figure 11, except that we include the
extreme top of the distribution (the top 0.3% and 0.1%) and that the y-axis is expressed in terms of wealth percentiles
instead of wealth amounts. The lifecycle profile for the top p% includes individuals who reach the top p% during their
observed lifespan (for at least three years), but who are not necessarily there in every year. This explains why the “top
p%” is always below the pth percentile cutoff on average. The graph shows that the top-1% sample (located between
the 98th and 99th percentile cutoffs throughout) corresponds well to the treatment group in the couples DD, while the
top-0.3% sample (located in the middle of the top 1% throughout) corresponds well to the treatment group in the ceiling
DD.
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FIGURE A.XI: EMPIRICAL LIFECYCLE PROFILES OF WEALTH FOR THE TOP 1% IN A
BALANCED PANEL
A: Balanced vs Unbalanced
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Notes: The figure shows lifecycle profiles of taxable wealth for the top 1% in a balanced panel. Panel A compares the
lifecycle profiles in the balanced and unbalanced panels between the ages of 70 to 90. Panel B compares the lifecycle
profiles before and after the tax reform in the balanced panel between the ages of 83 to 90. The figure is otherwise
constructed as the previous lifecycle graphs, including the fact that we consider averages of normalized log wealth (to
avoid the confounding effects of inflation) and the way in which we select the top 1% sample (those who make it to
the top 1% during the lifetime, but who are not necessarily there every year). The grey-shaded areas represent 95%
confidence intervals.
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FIGURE A.XII: CONSUMPTION PROFILES BEFORE AND AFTER WEALTH TAX REFORM
A: Couples DD (Moderately Wealthy)
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B: Ceiling DD (Very Wealthy)
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Notes: The figure shows the simulated consumption profiles before and after the wealth tax reform and the observed
income profile. Panel A shows the scenario where we calibrate the model to fit the estimates from the couples DD (the
moderately wealthy). Panel B shows the scenario where we calibrate the model to fit the estimates from the ceiling
DD (the very wealthy). These samples of older, wealthy people dissave in the baseline as consumption is larger than
income. When wealth taxes are cut, their dissavings fall in the beginning of the period and rise later in the period.
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FIGURE A.XIII: CALIBRATING THE BEQUEST ELASTICITY
A: Couples DD (Moderately Wealthy)
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B: Ceiling DD (Very Wealthy)
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Notes: The figure illustrates how the calibration of the bequest elasticity α (in conjunction with the EIS σ) works. The
calibration has to satisfy two requirements: (i) it has to fit the quasi-experimental estimates for years 1,...8 (based on
minimizing equation 17), (ii) it has to fit the flatness of the wealth profile over the last 10 years of life. The figure shows
that, if one ignored the second requirement and assumed alternative values for α, it is still possible to match the year
1-8 estimates by adjusting σ, but the lifecycle profile at the end of life would look very different from what is observed
in the data. We show this for both the couples DD (Panel A) and the ceiling DD (Panel B).
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